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 The number of migrants in the European Union (EU) has grown significantly since 2015.  
One of the main issues to consider is how these migrants are integrated into EU Member States.  
Although some EU policies are created at the supranational level, when it comes to issues like 
migration, states are allowed to exercise a generous amount of sovereignty.  Although the EU 
does encourage migrant integration, the degree to which migrants are able to integrate socially, 
economically, and culturally into their host societies varies within and between Member States.  
This research project examines the causes of migrant integration and determines if and how the 
Europeanization of migration policies plays a role. 
The central questions guiding this thesis are: How does the Europeanization of migration 
policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? Additionally, how do national 
level policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States?  The literature on migrant 
integration suggests that the power of the EU is limited related to migration policy.  Based on 
these themes of limited EU competences, I argue that national policy provisions will play a 
greater role in migrant integration than Europeanization. 
 Using case studies in Germany, Spain, and Hungary, these research questions are 
answered through an examination of Europeanization and migrant integration data.  
Transposition deficit scores, which measure how countries adapt legislation to meet the 
standards outlined in EU directives, are used to determine the extent of Europeanization in EU 
Member States.  Additionally, data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is used 
to conclude the degree of migrant integration in several policy areas at the national level, 
including health, education, and labor data.  These policies and national legislation from each of 
these three nations help determine the main cause of migrant integration.  
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Furthermore, this thesis project contributes to debates in the literature about European 
integration and migrant integration.  My findings support the multi-level governance approach as 
supranational actors like EU institutions work with national actors like EU Member States and 
civil society institutions to create and implement policies at the EU and national levels.  I found 
that while national actors do have a more important role in migrant integration, Europeanization 
may have a limited role in influencing common standards that Member States utilize when 
developing national policy provisions.  Additionally, the multi-level governance approach better 
explains the different levels of governance that play roles in creating migration policies at the 
supranational, national, regional and local levels. The results of this study also show that policies 
developed at the national level do indeed contribute more to migrant integration than levels of 
Europeanization.  These findings contribute to the literature on migration by supporting the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The migration crisis dominated headlines across the world in 2015 when the Syrian civil 
war intensified and caused thousands of migrants to flee the country.  This was the catalyst for 
the European migration crisis.  These migrants sought refuge mainly in the neighboring countries 
of Syria and the Member States of the European Union (EU).  Because of the accessibility of the 
Mediterranean Sea, a high number of migrants entered the borders of coastal states like Spain, 
Greece, and Italy.  As a result of this migration crisis, attention became focused on migration 
policies within the EU.   
Although the European Union does encourage migrant integration, the degree to which 
migrants are able to integrate socially, economically, and culturally into their host societies 
varies within and between Member States.  Member States are given a generous amount of 
sovereignty in regard to migration issues.  As a result, there are states like Germany, which has 
openly accepted a large number of refugees, and Member States like Hungary, which has openly 
opposed migration.  The policies formed in Member States affect how migrants are integrated.  
This thesis examines the roles of Europeanization and national policies on migrant integration. 
The central questions guiding this thesis are: How does the Europeanization of migration 
policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? Additionally, how do national 
level policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States?  Through three case 
studies in Germany, Spain, and Hungary this research question is answered.  Transposition 
deficit scores, which measure how countries adapt legislation to meet the standards outlined in 
EU directives, are used to determine the extent of Europeanization in EU Member States. 
Additionally, data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is used to determine the 
degree of migrant integration in several policy areas at the national level including health, 
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education, and labor policies.  The case studies include the transposition deficit scores, MIPEX 
data, and national policies from each of the countries to determine the main cause of migrant 
integration.  Because the literature emphasizes the EU’s lack of power in migration policy, I 
argue that national policies play a greater role in migrant integration than Europeanization.   
The results of this study show that policies developed at the national level do indeed 
contribute more to migrant integration than levels of Europeanization.  These findings contribute 
to the literature on migration by supporting the argument that Member States have more control 
over migration policies than supranational actors. While Member States must follow EU 
legislation, there is not specific legislation on migrant integration that must be applied in each 
Member State. Each nation is free to develop their own policies on migrant integration and these 
policies do not have to be harmonized.   
This thesis also contributes to the literature on European integration theories by showing 
the significance of the multi-level governance approach and its relevance to Europeanization.  
The main debate over European integration is between intergovernmentalist scholars and multi-
level governance scholars. Intergovernmentalists believe that national actors have the greatest 
influence over integration policies, while multi-governance scholars believe that European 
integration has been possible through the coordination of a variety of actors with different levels 
of power.   I find that while national actors do have a more important role in migrant integration, 
Europeanization may have a limited role in influencing common standards that Member States 
may choose to utilize when developing national policy provisions.  Additionally, the multi-level 
governance approach better explains the different levels of governance that create and enforce 
migration policies at the supranational, national, regional and local levels.  Member States do fall 
under the governance of the European Union but develop their own governance structures in 
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relation to migration and migrant integration.  Within states, policies that affect migrant 
integration may vary at the national and regional levels.  Thus, this multi-tiered structure is best 
explained by multi-level governance rather than the intergovernmentalist approach.  However, 
before I could fully understand the literature on Europeanization and migrant integration, I first 





















CHAPTER 2: MIGRATION POLICIES IN THE EU 
HISTORY OF MIGRATION POLICY IN THE EU 
Originally, migration policy was considered to be a part of the Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) pillar of European Union policies. The JHA policy area of the EU focused on four main 
issues: immigration, asylum, along with police and judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal 
matters. The Treaty of Maastricht created this third pillar for Justice and Home Affairs that was 
incorporated in 1993. The pillars ranged from a more supranational pillar for the European 
Communities, to Common Foreign and Security Policy, and to the Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) pillar. There was initial debate over whether JHA should be a part of the first pillar as a 
supranational, European Community issue or if it should be an intergovernmental issue (Ucarer, 
2020).  With this new pillar creation, the European Commission was marginalized in the 
decision-making process and the key decision making for JHA went to the JHA Council.   
The Amsterdam Treaty replaced the Treaty of Maastricht and changes were made to the 
co-decision procedures between EU institutions.  Debate ensued with the development of the 
Amsterdam Treaty and proposals were created to give greater roles to the Commission, European 
Parliament (EP), and Court of Justice.   Within this policy area, there was also a shift from 
intergovernmentalism to supranationalism as a result of these EU institutions gaining more 
power.   
        With the Amsterdam Treaty, migration was transferred to the first pillar, while police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained in the third pillar (Lavenex, 2015).  This means 
that migration was deemed a more supranational issue that should be dealt with at both the 
national and supranational levels. With the movement of migration to a more supranational level, 
the JHA Council was given a greater role and was able to try to adopt policies to ensure the free 
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movement of people within the EU while also keeping external security measures in place.  
Through this treaty, the Council also received a more dominant position in decision making. The 
Commission would also gain the right to initiate policy, while the EP gained more of a voice 
through the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and could be consulted for the decision-making 
procedure.  The EU Court of Justice also was allowed to make preliminary rulings in policy 
areas within the first pillar. 
The Amsterdam Treaty reforms also left criminal matters in the third pillar, including 
issues like combating crime, terrorism, human, drug, and weapons trafficking, corruption and 
fraud (Ucarer, 2020, p. 327).  However, the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 abolished the pillar 
structure and extended the Ordinary Legislative Procedure so that more EU institutions like the 
Council have a role in decision making.  The Treaty of Lisbon also established the creation of an 
Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) as the second goal of the EU (Lavenex, 2015).  
Now immigration policies fall under this AFSJ, which aims to ensure security while also 
promoting the protection of citizens’ rights and free movement within the EU.  
 
WHO DOES WHAT TODAY? 
The roles of EU institutions and Member States have changed over time.  When it comes 
to AFSJ and migration policy, the European Commission is still known as the executive wing of 
the EU.  The Commission proposes and initiates legislation and implements the decisions of the 
European Parliament and the Council of the EU.  The JHA Council, however, is a formation of 
the Council of the EU that has a hierarchical structure of policy making with four decision 
making layers (Lavenex, 2015).  The JHA Council helps develop cooperation and common 
policies on different issues and is made up of ministers from each EU Member State (Council of 
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the EU, 2019).  The Commission is specifically designated as the coordinator of policy proposals 
for asylum (Ucarer, 2020).  Furthermore, the Commission is also responsible for managing EU 
policies and works with the Court of Justice to ensure that EU law is applied in the EU Member 
States (European Union, 2019) 
The EU decision making process is a collective effort known as the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure (OLP). This procedure requires that the European Parliament and the Council of the 
EU approve legislation that is proposed by the Commission.  The OLP also applies to policies on 
both irregular and regular immigration (European Parliament, 2019).  The European Parliament 
and the Council review the proposals created by the Commission and propose amendments.  
When it comes to migration policy, the Commission has an agenda on how to handle migration 
issues and properly respond (European Commission, 2018a).  
Additionally, the Commission has proposed making a European Asylum Support Office, 
which would be a European agency with certain powers in crises and would allocate migrants 
among Member States based on quotas.  The Commission has also created an action plan that 
includes a policy framework and steps to have Member States integrate migrants (European 
Parliament, 2019).  
Within migration policy, the role of national parliaments has been strengthened and 
parliaments can evaluate the work of AFSJ bodies and agencies.  Member States also exercise 
sovereignty when it comes to migration policy and can coordinate cooperation regarding the 
integration of migrants (Lavenex, 2015).  For instance, the EU creates directives on migration 
that establish guidelines and standards that EU Member States must follow, but it is up to the 
individual Member States to develop and transpose these directives in a way that meets the 
standards but also fulfills the duties of each nation state.  It is harder for the EU to have more 
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competence in this area because states are more reluctant to surrender power over their own 
border controls.  Member States have the ability to determine how many people are admitted into 
their country, however the EU establishes the guidelines that allow for legal migration and legal 
residence.  When it comes to migrant integration, the EU can provide support and incentives for 
Member States to provide migrant integration measures, but there is no EU law that requires 
complete harmonization of national laws on migrant integration (European Parliament, 2019).  
Despite the freedom that Member States may have in the migration policy area, Member States 
must still follow EU Regulations on migration policies. 
Regulations are laws that are directly binding in all Member States directly and do not 
need to be passed into national law by the Member States.  A directive is a law that binds 
Member States to achieve some type of objective (European Commission, 2020b).  Usually, 
these directives must be transposed into national law to become effective.  When it comes to 
migration policies, there is a set of legally binding common standards on how to treat migrants 
and asylum seekers, but no one overarching policy or Regulation for migration that much be 
applied equally in each Member State. 
  The OLP is the most common procedure for adopting EU legislation.  Under this 
procedure, the Commission makes a proposal, which must be adopted by both the Parliament and 
the Council.  Generally, Member States are consulted for input on legislation during the co-
decision procedure. After the proposal is received, the first reading begins.  During this first 
reading, Member States examine the legislation in detail with the Council (European 
Commission, 2020b).  The Commission is also in constant dialogue with national parliaments 
and if “certain conditions are met” the Commission may review a proposal based on the national 
parliament’s opinions and publicly explain whether the proposal will be maintained, amended, or 
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withdrawn (European Commission, 2020b).  The national parliaments of the Member States also 
have the “right to express their concerns in relation to draft legislative acts” (European 
Commission, 2020b). 
Specifically, within the AFSJ, national parliaments have been given a new role.  
“National parliaments now have eight weeks in which to examine any given legislative proposal 
in the light of the subsidiarity principle; until that period has expired, no decision can be taken at 
EU level on that proposal” (European Parliament, 2018).  Essentially, without feedback from 
national parliaments, legislative proposals regarding migration will not be passed.  Additionally, 
“the Lisbon Treaty also made it clear that the EU shares competence in this field with the 
Member States, in particular as regards the number of migrants allowed to enter a Member State 
to seek work” (European Parliament, 2019).  Ultimately, the EU institutions and national 
governments work together to monitor migration.  The EU determines the conditions that govern 
entry into and legal residence in EU Member States, including circumstances for family 
reunification and for third country nationals.  Member States have the right to determine the 
“volumes of admission for people coming from third countries to seek work” (European 
Parliament, 2019).  When it comes to migration and asylum, the Commission has developed a 
proposal to which Member States have agreed to relocate asylum seekers from Greece and Italy 
to other EU countries (European Commission, 2020b). Various Council directives such as 
Directive 2003/86 set out provisions for migrant integration and family reunification.  However, 
it is up to the individual Member States on how to implement these directives and to decide on 





DIFFERENT TYPES OF MIGRATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The term migrant can be very confusing, especially when discussing migration into and 
within the European Union.  The EU describes migrants as both “regular” and “irregular.”  
Regular migrants are migrants who have entered the EU legally or are establishing their usual 
residence in the territory of an EU Member State, or have previously been a resident of another 
EU Member State (European Commission, 2016).  An irregular migrant in the EU context is a 
third country national (or someone who is not an EU citizen) who does not have proper legal 
documentation to enter the Schengen area (European Commission, 2016c).  Irregular migrants 
can include refugees, victims of human trafficking, and unaccompanied migrant children. 
In recent years, when the term migrant is used in the media or literature, it often refers to 
refugees and asylum seekers who wish to enter the EU.  However, after examining the 
descriptions of migrants in the literature, there actually seems to be four main types of migrants 
in the European Union: refugees/asylum seekers, economic migrants, internal migrants, and 
victims of human trafficking.  Refugees are migrants who arrive in the EU after fleeing their own 
country because of violence or fear of persecution.  Economic migrants are those who come to 
the European Union in search of a job or better economic or educational opportunities (European 
Commission, 2016).  Internal migrants are citizens of the European Union that migrate to other 
EU Member States for various reasons.  These internal migrants are also considered regular 
migrants.  Victims of trafficking are often brought into Europe through organized crime 
networks.  There are different levels of decision making and policies for each type of migrant.  
These policies may be under the supranational influence of the EU or may have more weight at 
the national level. The influence of EU institutions on policy and the nationalization of these 
policies are examples of the effects of Europeanization.  The better that Member States are able 
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to implement legal frameworks created by EU institutions into their own national policies, the 
greater the indication of Europeanization.  Because the EU does have a framework for migrant 
integration, countries that utilize this framework in their national policies will show how 
Europeanization can play a role in migrant integration.   
 
Refugee/Asylum Procedures 
Refugees are the type of migrants that are most recognized in the media around the 
world.  The migrants that flooded into the European Union during the Syrian refugee crisis 
attracted much attention to the EU and its Member States’ migration policies.  The decision 
making for refugees takes place by the European Union at the supranational level because the 
EU makes policies to manage migrants as they come into the EU.  For instance, asylum seekers 
are subject to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) which provides standards for 
asylum and placement of refugees.  The CEAS tries to ensure that asylum seekers are treated 
equally and fairly and aims to reduce the differences between Member States “on the basis of 
binding legislation” (European Commission, 2016).  There are three pillars that support the 
development of the CEAS: “bringing more harmonization to standards of protection by further 
aligning the EU States’ asylum legislation; effective and well-supported practical cooperation; 
increased solidarity and sense of responsibility among EU states, and between EU and non-EU 
countries” (European Commission, 2016a).  However, new EU rules have been created under 
CEAS to revise asylum directives, including the Dublin Regulation. 
The Dublin Regulation is the main EU legislation on asylum and establishes which 
Member State is responsible for the examination of an asylum application.  The Dublin 
Convention first came into force in 1997 and has been replaced with two Council Regulations.  
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The most recent Dublin Regulation (Dublin III Regulation No. 604/2013) entered into force in 
July 2013 and includes improvements to the Dublin procedure.  The current Dublin Regulation 
requires migrants to apply for asylum in the first EU country in which they arrive (Murray & 
Longo, 2018).   
Article seven of the third Chapter of the Dublin Regulation states the criteria for 
determining which Member State is responsible for asylum applications.  According to this 
article, Member State responsibility shall be determined on the basis of the situation obtaining 
when the applicant first lodged his or her application for international protection with a Member 
State” (European Union, 2013).  There are other contributing factors that determine which 
Member States are responsible for asylum applications.  Member States must consider evidence 
regarding family members, relatives or any other family relations of each applicant, as long as 
this evidence is provided before another Member State “accepts the request to take charge or 
take back the person concerned…and that the previous applications for international protection 
of the applicant have not yet been the subject of a first decision regarding the substance” 
(European Union, 2013).   
Member States must also make further considerations for families when processing an 
asylum application.  For instance, when an applicant is an unaccompanied minor, the Member 
State responsible will be where a family member or sibling of the minor is legally present as long 
as it is in the best interests of the minor.  Other considerations include visas and residence 
documents.  If an applicant has a valid residence document, the Member State which issued the 
document shall be responsible for examining the asylum application.  If an applicant “has 
irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, sea, or air having come from a third 
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country, the Member State thus entered shall be responsible for examining the application for 
international protection” (European Union, 2013).   
  Because the current Common European Asylum System’s flaws were exposed during the 
recent migrant crisis, the Commission has attempted to create some revisions.  The Commission 
is “proposing to revise and replace the current asylum instruments to better manage migration 
flows and offer adequate protection to those in need, in line with the approach set out in the 
European Agenda” (European Commission, 2016b).   In May 2016, the Commission presented a 
draft of a proposal to make the Dublin System more transparent and effective, and also provide a 
mechanism to handle disproportionate pressure on Member States’ asylum systems, which would 
be called the Dublin IV Regulation (European Commission, 2016b).    
Similarly, Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council is an 
international protection directive that focuses on the standards of living conditions for asylum 
seekers and conditions for applicants (European Parliament, 2013).  This directive aims to ensure 
that the human rights of asylum seekers in the EU are respected (Directive 2013/33/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, 2013).  This Directive also applies to applicants and 
their families for international protection.  Asylum seekers should have access to housing, food, 
clothes, financial allowances, a decent standard of living, and medical and psychological care.  
Under this Directive, EU countries should also guarantee that applicants can access employment 
within nine months and education for those under the age of eighteen.   
As seen through the Dublin Regulation, family reunification plays a large role in 
developing migration policies. There is an EU Directive that explicitly focuses on family 
reunification.  The Family Reunification Directive applies to family migration sponsored by third 
country nationals.  Directive 2004/83/EC represents EU Community legislation on free 
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movements and allows migration sponsored by migrants already in the EU (Block & Bonjour, 
2013, p. 205).  Sponsors of migrants are required to provide housing and must fulfill an income 
requirement.  Therefore, refugees and asylum seekers and their fates are determined by both 
supranational EU institutional policies and Member States.  
 
Legal Framework for Economic and Internal Migrants 
Although asylum seekers may be more subject to EU policies, economic migrants from 
third countries are subject to the policies of individual Member States.  For example, economic 
migrants may need to apply for a visa to work in the state in which they are trying to live.  Each 
Member State has its own policies for economic migrants and what someone would need to do in 
order to work there.  These policies not only vary from country to country but also vary based on 
the individual migrants and their background, as well as the conditions of entry into the country.  
For the purpose of this study, economic migrants refer to non-EU nationals who cross into the 
EU to work or live because of better economic or educational opportunities.  These non-EU 
nationals will have to undergo a different process to work in different Member States and may 
have to apply for a specific visa or work permit.  While EU law may help a migrant enter the EU, 
it is still up to the Member State to decide who is able to work in their country. 
 
Visas 
Certain non-EU nationals are required to have visas depending on their country of origin.  
An EU Regulation (2018/1806) from December 18, 2018 lists non-EU countries whose nationals 
must have a visa when entering the European Union and those whose nationals do not need a 
visa.  The Regulation does allow for some EU countries to have exceptions for the visa 
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requirement for certain “categories of persons” such as those who hold diplomatic or service 
passports, civilian air and sea crews, school groups, those with local traffic permits, and 
exemptions for refugees and stateless persons who reside in the EU and hold a travel document 
from their origin country (Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, 2018).  A few of the countries whose citizens must carry a visa include Afghanistan, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, and Bahrain.  Other countries such as Kosovo 
and the Palestinian Authority are not recognized as states by at least one Member State.  There 
are also countries that have citizens that are exempt from having a visa when crossing the 
external borders for stays of no more than 90 days in any 180-day period.  Some of these 
countries are North Macedonia, Andorra, the United Arab Emirates, Albania, Australia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Canada, Georgia, Israel, South Korea, Monaco, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Mexico, Serbia, San Marino, Ukraine, and the United States (Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, 2018).  Visa policies are also legally binding through 
EU Regulation 2018/1806.  This type of policy is considered Europeanized because it is created 
at the EU level and every Member State must follow it.  This is an example of top down 
Europeanization.   
 
Migration for Education and Research 
 Directive (EU) 2016/801 discusses the “entry and residence conditions for non-EU 
nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange 
schemes or educational projects and au pairing” (European Union, 2016a).  EU Member States 
themselves may decide to apply EU level rules to non-EU nationals wishing to come to the EU 
for one of the purposes outlined above.  To be admitted to an EU Member State, applicants must 
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have a valid travel document for the duration of their intended stay in the EU, evidence of 
resources to cover subsistence and the costs of return travel, and health insurance (European 
Union, 2016).   
 These non-EU nationals are also entitled to certain rights, including the right to be treated 
the same as EU citizens.  “This means, for example, that researchers--except in cases where EU 
countries can apply exceptions--are entitled to be treated on an equal footing with EU citizens” 
(European Union, 2016).   Students and researchers have the right to stay for at least nine months 
after finishing their studies so that they can look for work or start a business.  Additionally, 
family members of researchers are allowed to join them under specific conditions.   
 Directive 2003/109/EC focuses on the status of non-EU nationals who are long-term 
residents.  The Directive aims to set out the terms and conditions for granting (and withdrawing) 
long term residence to non-EU citizens who are legally living in the EU for at least 5 years 
(European Union, 2016b).  To obtain long-term resident status, non-EU citizens must have lived 
continuously and legally in an EU country for five years.  These non-EU nationals must prove 
they have the economic resources to support themselves and their family and they must have 
sickness insurance.  Authorities may refuse to grant resident status for public policy or public 
security reasons but cannot grant this status because of economic reasons.  Applicants who are 
successful are given a residence permit that is valid for at least five years and is automatically 
renewable.  Long-term residents may lose their status if they have acquired it by fraud, are 
considered a threat to public policy or security, or leave the EU for twelve consecutive months.  
Long-term residents enjoy equal treatment with country nationals when it comes to employment, 
education, social security, taxation, and freedom of association.  In certain cases, EU Member 
States may restrict this equal treatment.  This legislation does not apply to certain categories of 
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non-EU nationals, such as students or those who work as au pairs or seasonal workers (European 
Union, 2016).   
 
Internal Migrant Procedures 
For internal migrants, or EU citizens who migrate to other EU Member States to work or 
live, EU policies allow for citizens to move freely between Member States.  The EU 
Commission states that “the freedom to move to another EU country to work without a work 
permit is a right for EU nationals” (European Union, 2019).  Free movement of workers is one of 
the four freedoms of the EU and a fundamental right of the EU.  EU citizens “are entitled to: 
look for a job in another EU country, work there without needing a work permit, reside there for 
that purpose, stay there even after employment has finished, and enjoy equal treatment with 
nationals in access to employment, working conditions, and all other social and tax advantages” 
(European Commission, 2020a).  The literature shows that the main beneficiaries of the free 
movement are EU citizens who are actively seeking jobs (Ruhs, 2017).  EU citizens also have 
further rights like the ability to access welfare across borders (Martinsen et al., 2019).  
Additionally, the “family members of EU nationals working in another EU country are entitled 
to reside and work in that country (regardless of their nationality) and their children have the 
right to be educated there” (Ruhs, 2017, p. 24).  Therefore, the freedom of movement that has 
been made possible through the EU’s supranational authority prioritizes giving rights to internal 






Procedures for Victims of Human Trafficking  
Decisions regarding the fight against human trafficking are made at the supranational 
level.   Human trafficking is regarded as both a criminal and human rights issue and the EU tries 
to take a more holistic approach when trying to combat human trafficking.  The EU Council is 
heavily involved with battling human trafficking.  The EU Council Framework Decision on 
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (the FD) and the Council Directive on Short-term 
Residence Permits are two driving instruments of the fight against trafficking (Krieg, 2009).  
Although there are issues with implementing cooperation to combat trafficking at the Member 
State level and even the judicial level, human trafficking is addressed under the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice through the prevention and combating of crime through judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters (Krieg, 2009).  
The Framework Decision not only outlines that the defined acts be punished by criminal 
law in all Member States, but also ensures that Member States hold someone liable for the 
human trafficking offenses.  The FD is binding upon Member States and requires Member States 
to take appropriate actions and enforce criminal penalties for human trafficking crimes (Krieg, 
2009).  Thus, there are laws against human trafficking and protocols developed at the 
supranational level by EU institutions that are supposed to be enforced by Member States.  
Consequently, human trafficking victims who are brought into the EU are therefore under the 
decision-making procedures of the European Union.  
For this study, the term migrant will refer to non-EU nationals such as asylum seekers, 
refugees, and economic migrants and how they are integrated within the European Union.  As 




CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
Within the debate surrounding migration and integration policies, there are two main 
arguments.  One of these perspectives is liberal intergovernmentalism, which emphasizes the 
importance of Member States as the main actors in making EU policies.  The other main 
theoretical approach is multilevel governance, which considers that there are different sets of 
actors (local governments, national governments, supranational institutions) located within 
different layers of governance within the European Union.   
Andrew Moravcsik is one of the most prominent liberal intergovernmentalists who is 
often cited in other scholars’ work on intergovernmentalism.  He argues that when it comes to 
policy, decision making agreements between national governments are more effective because 
bargaining is more issue specific and balances out benefits among governments.  The main 
argument of Moravcsik’s book, The Choice for Europe is that “European integration can be best 
explained by a series of rational choices made by national leaders” (1998, p. 18).   
Moravcsik (1998) explains that understanding national preferences is the first step to 
understanding outcomes of international negotiation.  He argues that the literature on European 
integration accounts for national preferences in two broad categories: geopolitical interests and 
economic interests.  Geopolitical interests “reflect perceived threats to national sovereignty or 
territorial integrity” while economic interests reflect the imperatives induced by interdependence 
and show the opportunities for “profitable cross-border trade and capital movements” (p. 26).  
The central prediction of this geopolitical approach is that “when economic integration is 
perceived to generate positive geopolitical externalities, governments tend to favor integration” 
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(Moravcsik, 1998, p. 29).  However, when integration is perceived to create negative geopolitical 
externalities, governments are more likely to oppose integration.   
Moravcsik goes on to explain what he calls the supranational and intergovernmental 
bargaining theories.  The supranational bargaining theory maintains that “transaction costs are 
high relative to the gains from agreement for all actors except supranational officials” (p. 52).  
The intergovernmentalist theory assumes that transaction costs are low “and therefore the pattern 
of state preferences and power is the decisive determinant of specific agreements” (pp. 52-53).  
Many studies argue that supranational leadership is necessary for integration, but they all nearly 
demonstrate that while supranational actors attempt to propose initiatives, mediate between 
governments, and mobilize social groups, they do not show that supranational actors were 
actually essential actors to integration processes (p. 53). 
Furthermore, Moravcsik explains why he believes the intergovernmentalist approach is 
strongest and how intergovernmentalism played a fundamental role in the establishment of the 
European Community.  “The intergovernmental explanation focuses not on the availability of 
information and the intervention of supranational entrepreneurs but on the issue-specific 
distribution of bargaining power, which in turn reflects the nature and intensity of state 
preferences” (p. 60).   
Moravcsik argues that historically, European integration was a series of adaptations by 
national leaders that developed from an interdependent world economy, the relative power of 
states, and the potential for international institutions to help the credibility of interstate 
engagements (p. 472).  He asserts that five of the most important negotiations in European 
Community history including the Treaty of Rome, Common Agricultural Policy, the European 
Monetary System, the Single European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty, support his argument.  
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Generally, governments appeared to be better informed than supranational actors when it came to 
integration.  “Though they consistently acted as policy initiators, mediators, and mobilizers, 
Commission officials and Parliamentarians increased the efficiency of only one agreement, the 
Single European Act; they had no impact on the distribution of gains” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 479). 
The prominent EU integration theorist Ben Rosamond (2000) also discusses 
intergovernmentalism.  He explains that intergovernmentalist scholars agree that national 
governments and state actors are central actors to the development of the EU (p. 131).  The 
politics within nation states are fundamental when trying to understand the politics among states 
(p. 135). “It follows that in order to understand the bargaining that occurs between governments 
at the European level, we need to attend to the domestic roots of the state preferences which are 
negotiated in those bargains” (Rosamond, 2000, p. 135). National leaders are fundamental actors 
within the EU.  The European Council consists of the heads of the state or government of the EU 
Member States.  The Council of the European Union represents the governments of the Member 
States.  Although Member States surrender some of their sovereignty to EU institutions, these 
institutions are able to thrive because of the Member States and their leadership.  Rosamond 
(2000, p. 143) further elaborates that “states benefit from and use the institutional environment of 
the EU for purposes of domestic legitimation and the pursuit of preferences.”  
Additionally, he explains that, according to intergovernmentalists, Member States are the 
ones who set the boundaries within which supranational institutions operate (Rosamond, 2000, p. 
143).  One of the important functions of states is the role they play in intergovernmental 
bargaining where governments are seeking to advance their positions, secure their own 
preferences, and gain compliance from other governments (p. 144). 
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However, Rosamond also critiques elements of intergovernmentalism when examining 
the EU.  The European Union is not a state and does not function like one.  The multi-level 
governance position challenges intergovernmentalism and many scholars argue that 
intergovernmentalism is limited because it may only explain intergovernmental bargains and not 
how the EU functions as an entity with different layers of governing bodies (Rosamond, 2000, p. 
153).   
        Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, the two most renowned multi-level governance scholars, 
argue that multi-level governance, not just the actions of individual states or supranational 
institutions, allow EU integration to work and create effective policies.  They refer to 
intergovernmentalism as the state centric model, which places states and their governments as 
the ultimate decision makers when determining policies (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, 1996).  
Within this view, policies are created to reflect the best interests of Members State’s executive 
powers and supranational institutions which exist to aid states.  These policies follow the 
directions that states determine.  “The state-centric model does not maintain that policy-making 
is determined by state executives in every detail, only that the overall direction of policy-making 
is consistent with state control” (p. 345).  
   With this viewpoint, these scholars hold that those who argue that integration is fueled 
by intergovernmentalism are wrong because “individual state sovereignty is diluted in the EU by 
collective decision-making among national governments and by the autonomous role of the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Court of Justice” (Marks, 
Hooghe, & Blank, 1996).  Essentially, while nation states do have power within the European 
Union, they are not the sole actors, and may actually lose power to supranational institutions.  In 
their multi-level governance model, instead of decisions being monopolized by state executives, 
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the decision-making capabilities are shared by different actors at different levels. (Marks, et al., 
1996, p. 346).  The EU supranational institutions have their own independent roles in the 
decision-making process that are not just reflective of their role in aiding state executives.  
“States are an integral and powerful part of the EU, but they no longer provide the sole interface 
between supranational and subnational arenas, and they share, rather than monopolize, control 
over many activities that take place in their respective territories” (Marks, et al., 1996, p. 347).   
In their article in the American Political Science Review, Hooghe and Marks (2003) 
discuss different types of multi-level governance.  They begin by arguing why multi-level 
governance may be more effective than more centralized policies.  Centralized policies may 
impose one single policy that does not account for differences in the needs for regional and local 
political systems (Hooghe & Marks, 2003).  With multi-level governance, policy variations that 
arise at the local and regional levels are taken into consideration and “jurisdictions can be custom 
designed with such variation in mind” (p. 263).  Hooghe and Marks identify two types of 
governance: type I and type II. “One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-
purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions.  A second type of governance conceives of 
task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions” (p. 233). 
Type I governance “describes jurisdictions at a limited number of levels”, meaning that it 
is a hierarchical network of governance with nonintersecting power distributed at the 
subnational, national, and supranational levels (p. 236).  These jurisdictions bundle together 
multiple functions that include an assortment of policy responsibilities, including a court system 
and representative institutions.  However, in type I governance, there is “one and only one 
relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale (p. 236).  Conversely, Type II governance 
is a mixture of polycentric authorities with different overlapping jurisdictions that work at many 
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different territorial levels.  The ways in which these specialized jurisdictions operate varies and 
independent jurisdictions have different functions, “they tend to be lean and flexible—they come 
and go as demands for governance change” (p. 236). 
Both types of multilevel governance are seen throughout the Europe.  For instance, Type 
I multi-level governance is characterized by nonintersecting memberships.  This means that 
membership is territorial, “as in national states, regional, and local governments, but it can also 
be communal” (p. 237).  These jurisdictions and its memberships have boundaries and do not 
intersect.  This principle is seen through the European Union itself, which encompasses national 
states.  Each Member State has its own jurisdiction that does not overlap with another.  However, 
specific EU states may have different governance structures.  Type II governance is often seen at 
the local level where the public sector can be composed of different service industries.  For 
issues like local public services, jurisdictions can be comprised of regional government leaders, 
regional parliamentary representatives, city mayors, local authorities, etc.  Because the EU is 
comprised of many different actors at the international, national, regional, and local levels, multi-
level governance is the best approach when examining European integration. 
Other multilevel governance scholars make similar arguments. Nadalutti (2013) discusses 
the idea that those who have a multi-level understanding of governance argue that 
intergovernmentalists do not consider the importance of the distribution of power in the EU.  
This distribution of power can lead to more autonomy for both state and non-state EU actors (p. 
756).  In her own work, Nadalutti refers to Hooghe and Marks and their Type I and II multi-level 
governance models.  However, she does mention that the political alliances between all of these 
different actors and the various types of governance described in these models still need to be 
studied further.  Nadalutti wants to use her study to determine if EU institutions and subnational 
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actors are building an alliance that helps push multi-level governance through EU Regulations 
(Nadalutti, 2013, p. 757).  The analysis for Nadalutti’s study shows that sub-national actors have 
been able to mobilize effectively around the legislation for an EU Regulation at the supranational 
level through lobbying a variety of associations and bodies, ranging from the EU Committee of 
the Regions, the Association of European Border Regions (p. 768). 
Similarly, Bisong (2019) argues that multi-level governance plays a role in migration 
governance.  She uses the multi-level governance approach to explain how different levels of 
governance determine inter-institutional relationships within the EU and even have contributed 
to the European Union’s relationship with other international agencies.  More specifically, her 
article explores multi-level governance through power sharing between the EU and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Member States of both 
organizations (Bisong, 2019, p. 1295).  Multi-level governance “is manifested in a number of 
exchanges between subnational and transnational institutions, seemingly bypassing the State” 
(Bisong, 2019, p. 1297).   
Thus, Bisong contends that other countries and regions have taken the EU’s model of 
multilevel governance and used it to develop their own regional economic and political 
cooperation networks and multi-level institutions.  The formal and informal interactions between 
the EU and ECOWAS Member States contributes to blurring levels of migration governance.  
However, Member States and the Commissions of both the EU and ECOWAS play various roles 
in maintaining this governance, thereby proving that the multi-level governance framework is 
important for understanding how institutions like the European Union function.   
In terms of policy making in the European Union, multi-level governance scholars argue 
that for the intergovernmentalist argument to stand true, there should be evidence of state 
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executive dominance in decision making.  National governments could use their voices on the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers to exert their influence on other EU institutions.  
However, if the multi-level governance model is stronger, then the European Council and 
Council of the EU would show that they share the decision-making authority with the 
supranational institutions of the EU.  To explain the role that institutions play in forming the 
behavior of political actors in Europe, Hooghe, Marks, and Blank break down the policy making 
process into four phases: policy initiation, decision-making, implementation and adjudication 
(Marks et al., 1996). 
The European Commission is the EU institution with the power to initiate and draft 
legislation.  While the Commission solely has the power to initiate legislation, it is often 
influenced by other actors.  The Council has used soft law to influence the Commission by 
ratifying opinions, resolutions, and agreements and outside interest groups have also become 
more involved in the decision-making process.  The Commission does take the input of interest 
groups in the legislative process, but the Commission may have limited powers when there are 
internal divisions.  If members cannot come to an agreement, then a policy cannot be 
recommended.   
At one time, the Council of Ministers was said to be the main legislative body of the 
European Union.  The Council of Ministers is made up of Member State executives.  Today, 
those who support the intergovernmentalist approach argue that state executives maintain control 
in the decision-making process because they are able to maintain sovereignty and influence 
supranational institutions in national executives’ favor.  However, the legislative power of the 
European Parliament prevents states from having this control. Qualified majority voting helps 
prevent state executives from controlling decision making. Collective state control that was 
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exercised through the Council has dwindled because of the growing role of the European 
Parliament.  The Maastricht Treaty helped to establish more of a balance between the Council, 
the Parliament and Commission during the legislative process.  The Council cannot make 
legislative decisions without the support of at least one of the other two institutions unless it is 
unanimous (Marks, et al., 1996, p. 364).  Thus, governance in the EU is a complex system made 
up of various levels and actors.  This multi-level governance approach is important when 
determining if and how Europeanization plays a role in the development of migrant integration 
policies at different levels within the EU. 
 
EUROPEANIZATION-WHAT IS IT AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? 
Europeanization is a term that refers to the influence of the EU on policies (Featherstone 
& Radaelli, 2003).  Historically, it has been used to describe the homogenization of policies and 
institutions across the EU, but also of social norms, values, behavior, and cultural beliefs.   
Europeanization can refer to “national changes towards European standards and compliance with 
a supranational entity or relates to the socio-structural foundations of European integration and 
its societal consequences” (Carlson et al., 2018).  Furthermore, the idea of Europeanization also 
makes sense in the context of multi-level governance.  Multi-level governance emphasizes the 
role of various actors within the EU and how power is transferred between them.   
In more modern times, the ‘Europe’ in Europeanization has referred to mainly Western 
European influence. In fact, the term Europeanization has been attributed with the transition to 
democracy in areas like central Europe (Featherstone, 2003, p. 8).  Furthermore, Europeanization 
“today is most often associated with domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or 
indirectly from EU membership” (Featherstone, 2003, pp. 6–7).   
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Europeanization is often referenced in relation to regional integration and how it affects 
different actors and institutions of the EU.  Europeanization is “inherently an asymmetric 
process” and the impact of it varies from country to country, institution to institution, and the 
national to the supranational (Featherstone, 2003, p. 4).  Because its impact varies, it is important 
to examine Europeanization’s impact on national policies and how it affects how these policies 
are implemented among EU Member States.   
There are further ways to discuss and define Europeanization.  For instance, top down 
Europeanization refers to the way that the EU transfers policies to the Member States. Scholars 
like Mathieu (2016) argue that Europeanization initially was used to refer to institution building 
at the EU level and is now used to refer to the process through which institutions at the EU level 
affect Member States (p. 27).  Top down Europeanization has become the most prominent 
conceptualization of Europeanization as scholars continually examine the effects of EU 
institutions and policies on Member States (Mathieu, 2016).  Van Wolleghem (2019) argues that 
EU institutions influence the way that policies are implemented at the national level.  Jordan 
(2003) agrees, stating that the “EU has also transformed national policy” (p. 262).  The 
scholarship suggests that while national administration structures like departments, parliaments, 
and implementing agencies can resist Europeanizing pressures, national laws and policies have 
still been deeply Europeanized (Jordan, 2003, p. 264).  The way that a policy has been 
Europeanized could explain why an EU directive can have different impacts in different 
European countries (Jordan, 2003).   
While the top down approach to Europeanization is the most common conception, the 
bottom up Europeanization approach is also important. This approach references the manner in 
which different European actors transfer policy to the European Union.  Because Member State 
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representatives have a presence and voice in institutions like the European Council, where the 
heads of government and state represent their own nation, these national leaders along with civil 
society organizations within these Member States may influence EU legislation and institutions.  
Van Wolleghem (2019) discusses a different kind of Europeanization called soft 
Europeanization.  This form of Europeanization is not often mentioned in literature but relies on 
the concept of soft law and the European Union’s influence.  Soft power refers to one’s ability to 
use tactics such as persuasion or diplomacy to influence others rather than using hard power like 
violence or coercion.  The EU is often stated to have soft power in the international sphere 
because its power does not derive from its military. The EU’s power comes from its leaders, 
values, and economy. Soft Europeanization draws from both the bottom up and top down models 
of Europeanization.  “In the case of soft law though, implementation of EU outputs is not driven 
by EU legislation but by national initiatives, carried out by national governments” (Van 
Wolleghem, 2019, p. 18). 
Although Europeanization is used throughout the social sciences and can explain the 
European Union’s influence, there are criticisms of the concept.  Celata & Coletti (2019) explain 
how Europeanization has been accused of being too state centric.  It may also be seen as a 
process of “homogenization and exclusion” (Schwell, 2016, p. 259).  Euroscepticism also plays a 
role in the criticism of Europeanization.  Critics who question the European Union and its 
policies examine the role that Europeanization plays in Member States.   
Although the various forms of Europeanization are all important, this research project 
will focus on the top down version of Europeanization, as I am examining the effect of EU 
migration policies on individual Member State policies.  The idea of Europeanization is 
important because it can help with understanding how policies are implemented in the European 
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Union at both the supranational and national level.  In terms of migration policy, the EU does 
have established frameworks on integration and general migration Regulations and directives 
that Member States must follow.  The way that states transposes the EU guidelines that the EU 
proposes is a form of Europeanization.  The migration policies that are nationalized in these 
Member States will have levels of migrant integration that vary from state to state.  Thus, the 
Europeanization of migration policies should be reflected at the national level.   
 
CURRENT STATE OF MIGRATION POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Despite the fact that Europeanization of migration policies should emerge at the Member 
State level, it is not always apparent.  EU scholars agree that an overall improvement in the 
migration policy area is necessary to prevent another potential crisis from happening.  
Essentially, there needs to be more of a centralization of migration policies and more cohesion 
between EU Member States and institutions.  Scipioni (2018) says that the “crisis came as a 
result of weak monitoring, lack of policy harmonization, low solidarity, and absence of central 
institutions” (p. 1358).   Consequently, the lack of EU institutional involvement has led to policy 
failure in the migration and border security area.   
Scipioni argues that policy failure has also come as a result of incomplete governance 
structures.  When many EU laws are formed, incomplete contracts are created that lack many 
implementation details.  The justification for these incomplete agreements is that contracts would 
take too long to arrange and cover every detail that needs to be included (Scipioni, 2018).  
However, this incompleteness means that policies are essentially set up to fail, especially if there 
are no enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure that states follow them equally.  A lack of EU 
institutional involvement means that there is also weak monitoring of such policies.  The 
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migration crisis has also caused states to call into question what international norms should be 
(Emiliani, 2017).  Additionally, a divergence of state interests combined with the lack of EU 
involvement has also led to inequalities in the way policies are enforced. 
         States have expressed worries about the effectiveness of EU policies and the fact that the 
implementation of policies is not enforced equally.  Following the creation of the Maastricht 
Treaty, states quickly realized that the agreements regarding asylum and migration were not 
effective, especially because the policies were incomplete when it came to emergency 
procedures (Scipioni, 2018).  States expressed dissatisfaction about the manner in which the 
distributions for processing applications was handled even before the Syrian refugee crisis.  
There was an uneven distribution of applications where some countries received 
disproportionately more asylum seekers than others.  This gap in national implementation is 
emphasized throughout Scipioni’s article but is also seen in other literature surrounding EU 
border, migration, and asylum policies.  
         Furthermore, another common theme in the literature surrounding these issues is the idea 
of burden sharing.  Greece and Italy were inundated with thousands of asylum seekers at the 
height of the refugee crisis because they are countries on the Mediterranean Sea that are very 
accessible to migrants. However, because of the rules in the current Common European Asylum 
System and the Dublin Regulation, states do not have much control over how many applicants 
they receive.  The Dublin Regulation in place at the time of the refugee crisis required migrants 
to apply for asylum in the first EU country in which they arrived (Murray & Longo, 2018).  This 
law meant that Greece and Italy were overwhelmed with both refugees and asylum applications, 
while other countries like Poland did not receive very many migrants or as many applications.  
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         Borowicz (2017) discusses the consequences of the different actions of various Member 
States and argues that the lack of cohesiveness and solidarity between Member States may also 
lead to incompetency in EU policies.  This lack of solidarity may have economic, social, and 
political consequences and may lead to lack of policy agreement.  Lavenex (2018) argues that 
there needs to be a fairer distribution of asylum seekers to improve migration policy.  This 
burden sharing issue indicates that there needs to be more cohesive policies among Member 
States that require Member States to take more refugees so that certain countries are not faced 
with a large burden while others are not affected at all.  
         Furthermore, the EU is an organization that prides itself on upholding its values like 
respect for human rights.  However, Lavenex also indicates that when it comes to migration 
policy there is evidence of organized hypocrisy in the EU which affects human rights.  She 
defines organized hypocrisy as “the concurrent reinforcement of protective claims and 
protectionist policies” (Lavenex, 2018, p. 1195).  Because Member State approaches are 
different, and some states would rather close their borders to refugees than accept them, there 
seems to be a juxtaposition between what the EU says and how policies are actually 
implemented.  With the current state of migration policies in the EU, there is no way to ensure 
that every state is implementing the policies in the same ways, especially with minimal EU 
institutional involvement.   
This organized hypocrisy idea is present in other works, just under a different name.  
Murray and Longo (2018) refer to it as interests versus values but present the same central idea 
that while the EU promotes a values-based approach of migrant acceptance, the national policy 
interest differences between states does impact the outcome of policy implementation.  For 
instance, countries like Poland and Hungary have been singled out for not taking effective policy 
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responses to the migration crisis and denying access to asylum seekers (Murray & Longo, 2018).  
This clash of interests versus values prevents migration policies from being executed equally.  
         Additionally, Murray and Longo also emphasize that there is a struggle for leadership and 
policy coherence among and within EU institutions to bring about a common and effective 
approach to migration policy (2018).  There have been many meetings in the European Council, 
but they have not resulted in a common position because national interests have dominated EU 
values and interests.  Germany acted unilaterally and opened German borders to migrants and 
circumvented the Dublin Regulation.  This act upset other EU actors and many other states 
turned against Germany.  Unilateral action in this case was for humanitarian causes, but if states 
do act independently and without consultation it further undermines the EU.  
The rise in populist and nationalist movements seen across Europe also shows problems 
with EU leadership and governance.  Populist, anti-migrant narratives can hurt the EU’s 
legitimacy and place the EU as the enemy of the people (Murray & Longo, 2018, p. 416).  If 
citizens do not feel as if they can trust the EU, then policies become more ineffective because 
state leaders and citizens will not be willing to follow them.  Murray and Long also state, “EU 
legitimacy is primarily dependent on Member States’ willingness to confer legitimacy to the 
collective decision making of the EU” (Murray & Longo, 2018, p. 412).  
Member States are not very willing to give up sovereignty in the migration policy area.  
However, EU institutions may be able to influence states in non-official ways, which may help 
states be more willing to effectively implement policies.  In Riddervold’s article about EU 
security and defense policies, the author shows how EU institutions like the European 
Commission influence individual Member States.  Riddervold says, “Commission officials’ 
expert knowledge in different fields is important for understanding EU integration, including in 
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inter-governmental policy areas” (Riddervold, 2016, p. 357).  Although the Commission may not 
have a direct impact on Member State decisions within the Common Security and Defense 
Policy, Member States may assess the Commission’s policy proposals input before they do make 
any common action decisions.  States often seek advice from EU institutions, which means that 
more institutional involvement can be beneficial for Member States.  The Commission may also 
be regarded as a “policy entrepreneur”, or someone that aims to initiate a policy change (Menz, 
2013).  When it comes to migration policy, the Commission has worked to create and improve 
the Common European Asylum System and create a foundation for a “pan-European Regulation 
of asylum” (Menz, 2013, p. 93).   
Reslow (2017) proposes that the EU should utilize external cooperation and work with 
non-EU actors more to help better migrant conditions and manage migrant flows.  However, 
Reslow also says that external cooperation policy needs to be evaluated more before official 
policies can be created. There is not enough focus on external cooperation policies in EU 
literature (Reslow, 2017).  Thus, there are some thoughts about possible policy solutions, but 
nothing concrete.  There are definitely serious problems with current EU migration policies, 
however, there is not a clear path to make these policies more cohesive.  
 
INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS 
 The lens of multi-level governance also helps to understand policies of migrant 
integration because it shows how supranational actors and EU Member States work together to 
implement common standards in regard to migration and migrant integration.  Member States 
must ensure that they are upholding EU standards such as respect for human rights.  However, 
Member States may take different measures for migrant integration.  For migrants that are non-
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EU citizens, these measures can range from complete cultural assimilation to multiculturalism 
where different cultures live simultaneously, but separately (Van Wolleghem, 2019, pp. 5–8).  
Integration ability varies from Member State to Member State, but the degree of integration a 
migrant is able to achieve affects the everyday lives of migrants.  Additionally, the impact that 
migrants will have on a society depends on their ability to adapt to a host country (Kagan, 2019).  
Because the EU does not have a unified, binding integration policy, it is up to each 
Member State to create its own policies that allow migrants to integrate into societies 
(Gregurović & Župarić-Iljić, 2018).  Supranational institutions and Member States must work 
together so that migrants receive the proper aid and support to which they are entitled as a basic 
human right.  Van Wolleghem (2019) states, “it is evident, therefore, that the interaction between 
the EU and its Member States is the driver of policy development at the EU level” (p. 11).  Van 
Wolleghem also argues that in order for this interaction to take place, migrants first must be 
integrated at the national level.   
There are also different types of integration of migrants within the European Union.  
Migrants can be integrated politically, legally, and socially.  For instance, a migrant may acquire 
a job in the EU and be integrated through labor, but not feel as if he/she fit into the culture of 
his/her host country.  A migrant may not know the language or customs of his/her new nation 
and may not feel as if they are socially integrated or ever will be.  A migrant may be eligible for 
healthcare benefits but may not be able to understand physicians and not receive a translator. 
Essentially, giving a migrant civil and social rights helps the individual to integrate into a 
physical community, but that does not necessarily integrate them into the political community, 
which is “political rights, to the right to participate in the collective definition of the future of a 
society” (Van Wolleghem, 2019, p. 11).   Because migration is a central part of European society 
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through the flow of goods and humans across borders, Member States need to adopt effective 
integration policies.  If a Member State does not create a successful integration policy, there may 
be ramifications for European labor markets and economies as well as for security issues (Van 
Wolleghem, 2019).   
One of the most extreme forms of integration is assimilation.  While integration means 
that migrants have the opportunity to engage in the social sphere of their new society, 
assimilation requires migrants to completely conform to the new culture around them.  
Essentially, assimilation means that migrants adapt their “lifestyle to the social class to which 
they aspire to belong” (Jackson, 2011, p. 19).  This assimilation can be through religion, 
language, and way of dress.  Some scholars argue that migrants should not be required to 
assimilate and should be allowed to practice their own culture or religion (Jackson, 2011).  Some 
migrants do choose to assimilate so that they can feel as if they belong to their new culture. 
There are states that use language testing “as a tool for the Regulation of migration 
processes and official citizenship” (Augustyniak & Higham, 2019, p. 514).  Learning the 
language of the state to which one has migrated is one form of integration and can be a factor in 
the feeling of cultural ‘belongingness’ (Augustyniak & Higham, 2019, p. 514).   
There is also a version of integration that is not as absolute as assimilation.  While some 
migrants do completely assimilate, some migrants also prefer non-assimilation integration which 
means they base their identity in their country of origin and adapt some of the lifestyles of the 
new culture in which they now live.  There is some mixing of cultures like a hybrid culture of 
their origin country and new society (Jackson, 2011, p. 19).   
Some scholars propose that there needs to be more inclusive models of integration and a 
conception of citizenship.  A new conception of nationalism and multinational citizenship would 
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include different cultural backgrounds for migrants who wish to become citizens of the countries 
to which they immigrate (Augustyniak & Higham, 2019).   
In contrast, some migrants choose to keep their culture completely separate from that of 
their new society and do not integrate any part of their new culture.  These migrants may not 
wish to culturally integrate because they do not feel a sense of cultural belonging.  There are 
various reasons a migrant may or may not culturally integrate into the new society.  Some may 
not integrate because of personal preference, while others may be restricted because of Member 
State policies.  Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Petrantuono’s (2017) study discovered that 
naturalization may actually help the social integration of immigrants.  Their article discusses a 
scholarly debate over whether naturalization is a crown or a catalyst.  Naturalization can be a 
motivator for migrants to integrate (a catalyst) or may be an excuse for migrants to not fully 
integrate (a crown). 
 Additionally, Hainmueller et al. emphasize that social integration is very important for 
migrants.  They define social integration as the removal of barriers so that migrants can fully 
participate in society (p. 257).  This type of integration allows for economic mobility, civic 
engagement, and political participation.  This allowance can improve migrants’ lives and gives 
them the ability to better contribute to their host country.   There are concerns that the growing 
number of migrants may lead to issues with social capital and thus the lack of acceptance of the 
institutions and norms of the host country.  Contrarily, the social integration of migrants would 
help maintain social cohesion.   
The study done by Hainmueller et al. showed that naturalization helped improve the long-
term social integration of immigrants.  However, the naturalization effect does vary depending 
on the group of migrants.  More marginalized groups such as migrants from Turkey had a larger 
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concentration of positive effects as compared to groups born in Switzerland, where the study 
took place.  They also found that “integration returns are larger when immigrants naturalize 
earlier...in their residency” (Hainmueller et al., 2017, p. 257).  Their findings suggest that it may 
be more effective for countries to have less strict and shorter residency requirements for longer 
stays.  These slightly more lenient naturalization requirements may help migrants more fully 
integrate and contribute more to their new societies.   
Besides social and cultural integration methods, migrants may also be able to integrate 
more quickly through labor markets. The EU does not have a common set of EU labor migration 
policies.   Scholars argue that there needs to be a reformation of the EU labor policies to 
accommodate for the evolving market as the separate Member State labor markets slowly merge 
into one large market.  International migrant workers should be able to access EU labor markets, 
especially as more skilled workers are needed.  Migrants should be integrated into the EU market 
whether they are entering the EU for employment opportunities or even for family, asylum, 
education, or other reasons (Martín & Venturini, 2015).   
There are also now different forms of labor migration in the European Union.  For 
instance, migrant workers may enter for seasonal work, temporarily as high and low skilled 
workers, and even to answer temporary job postings.  The variety of opportunities available and 
the influx of migrants into the EU also means that there is an increasing risk and vulnerability of 
migrant workers’ rights (Verschueren, 2016).  These directives help with protection of social 
security rights of migrants, but “they need to be complemented by other instruments such as 
multilateral or bilateral agreements with third countries, or even human rights instruments” 
(Verschueren, 2018, p. 100). Member States are reluctant to surrender sovereignty over the 
admissions criteria that are used to admit migrants to their own labor markets (Verschueren, 
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2016, p. 101).  Nations may want to develop labor policies that enable them to compete against 
each other and further their own markets, which may not always work in migrants’ favor. 
Verschueren goes on to explain some of the directives that have been developed to 
facilitate labor migration.  Directive 2009/50/EC was adopted to help facilitate the admission of 
qualified workers and their family members.  This Directive is called the “Blue Card Directive” 
and it is designed to attract as many talented/skilled workers as possible.  Through this Directive, 
migrant workers will receive a large range of rights.  For instance, these workers receive the right 
to be treated equally with the nationals of EU Member States that have issued the EU Blue Card 
(Verschueren, 2016, p. 104).  Under this equal treatment, skilled migrant workers have the 
ability to join workers’ organizations and social security.  These workers would also receive state 
pensions that Member States must pay to these former blue card holders when they move to a 
third country just as they would pay pensions to their own nationals.  These types of labor market 
directives could be considered a form of bottom up Europeanization as Member States have 
exercised their influence on the labor market and flexed their sovereignty to obtain policies that 
have been created at the EU level. 
 
EUROPEANIZATION OF MIGRATION POLICIES IN THE EU 
 There is not much literature on the Europeanization of migration policies in the EU.  
However, the existing literature does suggest that treaties such as the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
Treaty of Lisbon have caused migration policies to become more and more Europeanized as they 
are more centralized in EU institutions.   
Governance plays a large role in Europeanization and how these concepts are connected 
at the national and supranational levels.  There are different levels of governance, including hard 
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and soft governance.  Governance is an important part of how the EU is facilitated and 
understanding both hard and soft governance can help understand EU influence on policies and 
the power relations within the European Union (Dudek & Pestano, 2019).  Hard governance 
refers to coercion or required legal mechanisms, while soft governance refers to the cooperation 
of other actors or EU influence.  Some scholars argue that the EU’s soft governance plays a role 
in the Europeanization of migration policies.   
One example of hard governance is the Schengen Agreement, which is legally binding 
between the participating European countries.  The Schengen Agreement is bound by law 
through the Treaty of Amsterdam.  This Treaty also gives the EU more authority in terms of 
migration even though national governments have primarily been the controllers of migration in 
the past.  The Schengen Agreement makes migration control a more multi-level EU issue and the 
EU’s supranational institutions play a larger role in migration, visa, and asylum policies (Dudek 
& Pestano, 2019). 
Europeanization may also be connected to issues of identity and what it means to be 
European.  Members of the European Union are bonded by a set of core values.  “EU members 
and particularly those of the Schengen area partaking in the ‘Area of Freedom, Security, and 
Justice’ not only subscribe to common action plans and interests but also to norms and values 
that are perceived as binding for all participants” (Schwell, 2016, p. 262). 
The requirements to be an EU Member State may also be a great example of 
Europeanization.  For a nation to become an EU Member State, it must demonstrate that it is 
willing to follow and promote the democratic values of the EU.  The first step for accession is 
that a state must fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, which are a set of rules that determine the 
eligibility of a state to apply for EU membership.  Countries who wish to apply must ensure their 
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institutions must guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities, and 
a functioning market economy with the ability to implement the obligations of EU membership, 
including the political, economic, and monetary union (European Commission, 2016).   Member 
States that wish to demonstrate they follow EU values may show this through their national 
policies on migration by making sure their policies meet EU guidelines.  This means that there is 




















CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 In this study, I seek to understand whether it is policy decisions at the EU level or 
decisions at the national level that have the most impact on the successful integration of migrants 
into European societies.  Specifically, I ask two questions: A) How does the Europeanization of 
migration policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? B) How do national 
level policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? In order to find answers to 
these questions, I plan to test empirically four separate hypotheses.   
Hypothesis 1: The degree of migrant integration in an EU Member State correlates positively 
with the level of Europeanization of that Member State’s migration policy.   
Hypothesis 2: The degree of migrant integration in an EU Member State correlates positively 
with national labor integration policy provisions for migrants. 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of migrant integration in an EU Member State correlates positively 
with national education policy provisions for migrants. 
Hypothesis 4: The degree of migrant integration in an EU Member State correlates positively 
with national healthcare policy provisions for migrants.   
 
MEASURING MIGRANT INTEGRATION 
         The Migration Policy Institute defines integration as “the process by which immigrants 
become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups” (Penninx, 2003).  While this is 
a vague definition, the ability of migrants to integrate varies from country to country. There are 
many variables that may contribute to migrant integration in host societies. Migrants may be 
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given the opportunity to integrate through access to resources such as healthcare, education, and 
political participation.   
While there is more than one way to measure integration, the most complete overview of 
integration policies comes from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Gregurović & 
Župarić-Iljić, 2018).  The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is a tool that measures 
migrant integration policies in all of the EU Member States as well as Australia, Canada, Iceland, 
Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.  This 
tool uses 167 policy indicators that cover eight policy areas.  The data from the MIPEX project is 
used by policy makers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), researchers, European and 
international institutions to help compare integration policies at the national level and to improve 
them (Huddleston et al., 2015).  MIPEX can also serve as a tool to help evaluate and compare 
integration policies and may even serve as a tool for Member States to create a legal framework 
to help migrants integrate by receiving the same access to employment, education, and 
healthcare, free from discrimination, and have equal opportunity for community engagement 
(Gregurović & Župarić-Iljić, 2018, p. 110).  MIPEX data will serve this study by determining 
integration levels in Germany, Spain, and Hungary.   
Additionally, part of the methodology used for gathering the data and determining the 
score criteria involves aspects of Europeanization, which makes the MIPEX data even more 
important to this study.  The authors state, “MIPEX identifies the highest European and 
international standards aimed at achieving equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for all 
residents” (Huddleston et al., 2015).  These standards are used to formulate the questionnaires 
and scores used for the MIPEX study.  Furthermore, the authors list several EU directives, 
including the EC Directive on the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, 
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2003/109 and EC Directive on the right of citizens and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States as sources of MIPEX equality standards.  They 
also state that “MIPEX does not monitor transposition itself, but rather the implementation of the 
highest standards sometimes found within relevant Directives on migration” (Huddleston et al., 
2015).  The usage of EU directives and policies for the MIPEX methodology means that 
measures of Europeanization were used to indicate to what degree the MIPEX nations actually 
implemented the goals set out in these directives.   
In essence, MIPEX is a composite index, which consists of over a hundred indicators that 
fall under policy areas such as education, healthcare, labor market mobility, political 
participation, and more.  To calculate the scores for each policy area, there are policy indicator 
questions relating to specific policy components of each of the policy areas.  There are three 
options for each answer to these questions.  Three points is awarded as a maximum when 
policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment. The indicator scores are averaged 
together to give one out of four dimension scores which examine the same aspect of each policy. 
The four dimension scores are then averaged together to get the policy area score for the 
different policy areas.  After being averaged one more time, each overall score is calculated for 
each country.  For the rankings and comparisons, this initial one, two, three scale is converted 
into a 0, 50, 100 scale for the dimensions and policy areas, with 100% as the top score 
(Huddleston et al., 2015). 
One way to measure migrant integration is to examine these indicators for any 
inequalities migrants may face.  The literature identifies education as a key factor of migrant 
integration.  Education can be a key component to migrant integration by helping migrants adapt 
to new countries faster (Kagan, 2019).   Several of the indicators used to measure the education 
44 
 
policy area for the MIPEX data were migrants’ abilities to access education, rating if education 
programs targeted migrants’ specific needs, and rating if the curriculum encouraged intercultural 
education and diversity (Huddleston et al., 2015).   
Access to a labor market can also be another way to measure migrant policies.  From an 
economic perspective, “the impact of immigrants depends on their economic performance and 
how well they adapt to their host country” (Kagan, 2019, p. 33).  The greater accessibility 
migrants have to labor markets may indicate that the integration policies for their host country 
are more Europeanized.  For the MIPEX study, the labor market mobility score was calculated 
by using indicators such as the degree of access migrants have to the Member States’ markets, 
including access to the public and private sectors, access to support like training or validation of 
skills, and the receipt of workers’ rights.   
Another important factor in migrants’ ability to integrate is healthcare.  The World Health 
Organization (WHO) emphasizes that access to healthcare is a basic right that everyone should 
have.  The WHO has also created a report for a global action plan to promote the health of 
refugees and migrants.  For the MIPEX study, some of the indicators used to determine the levels 
of integration in terms of healthcare were if migrants were allowed healthcare coverage, if 
migrants and asylum seekers received administrative discretion and documentation, if they had 
access to qualified interpreters, and if diversity was encouraged in healthcare workplaces 
(Huddleston et al., 2015).  While education, labor market mobility, and healthcare are not the 
only variables that play a role in migrant integration, the literature seems to indicate that they 
may play the most important roles in migrant integration.  For this thesis, the MIPEX data will 
be used for these different policy areas as these indicators will vary at the national level and 
reflect different levels of integration and Europeanization.   
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In addition to MIPEX, another way of measuring integration is using data found in the 
Eurobarometer surveys.  Funded by the European Commission, the Standard Eurobarometer is a 
series of public opinion surveys consisting of about 1,000 face-to-face interviews per country.  
The results of these surveys are made into reports that are published at least twice yearly.  There 
are also Special Eurobarometer reports that are based off of thematic studies that are done for the 
European Commission or other EU institutions.  These reports vary in topic and are integrated in 
the Standard Eurobarometer’s polling waves.  A third type of Eurobarometer, called the Flash 
Eurobarometer, is done on request for different services of the Commission.  The Flash 
Eurobarometer is an ad hoc thematic telephone interview.  These flash surveys allow the 
Commission to obtain results quickly and focus on specific target groups.  All of these 
Eurobarometer studies help “investigate in-depth the motivations, feelings and reactions of 
selected social groups towards a given subject or concept, by listening to and analysing their way 
of expressing themselves in discussion groups or with non-directive interviews” (European 
Commission, 2019a). 
 
EUROPEANIZATION AND MIGRANT INTEGRATION 
The degree to which Member States adopt legislation related to EU directives is 
Europeanization, the degree of which I want to assess, in order to estimate its effect on migrant 
integration.  Scholten and Penninx (2016) state that migrant integration “has largely been a 
purview of the nation state, as ideas about how to integrate migrants are often strongly correlated 
with ideas about national identity” (p. 92).  Free movement of EU citizens is at the center of 
European integration.  “It is a key supranational element of the Europeanization of immigration 
policies and has had a clear binding effect on Member States” (Scholten & Penninx, 2016, p. 95).   
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Europeanization of policies on immigration and border security is exemplified through 
policies like the Schengen Agreement, which stopped border controls and adopted joint 
immigration policy measures (Scholten & Penninx, 2016). The Treaty of Amsterdam, The 
Lisbon Treaty, the Dublin Convention, and asylum and migration becoming a part of the first 
pillar are all examples of the Europeanization of migration policies. These are the first steps 
taken to try to create a Common EU policy.  The Lisbon Treaty further normalized migration 
policy as a central EU issue and strengthened the role of EU institutions like the European 
Parliament and European Court of Justice, especially when it comes to issues like migration 
(Scholten & Penninx, 2016, p. 95). Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx (2016) explain that 
integration policies have become more Europeanized instead of just a process between the 
migrants and their host nations.  In 2003, the European Commission created a more 
comprehensive view on integration policies and “integration was conceived as a balance of rights 
and obligations, and policies took a holistic approach targeting all dimensions of integration 
(including economic, social, and political rights; cultural and religious diversity; and citizenship 
and participation)” (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016, p. 2).   
The following year, the Council of the EU agreed on the Common Basic Principles 
(CBPs) for integration as a step towards a shared European framework to migrant integration and 
a reference point for the implementation and evaluation of future integration policies.  In the 
process of evolving this framework and getting Member State cooperation, the definition of what 
it means to have full migrant integration has changed.  The Commission states that stakeholders 
at all levels need to be involved at all levels for successful integration policies (Garcés-
Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016, p. 2).    EU institutions, Member States, human rights 
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organizations, and civil society organizations need to work together to promote full migrant 
integration that is outlined in this EU framework.   
 
MEASURING EUROPEANIZATION 
         Although there are various definitions of Europeanization, for the purposes of this study 
the conceptualization provided by Van Wolleghem (2019) will be used.  Van Wolleghem 
emphasizes the idea that the way that policies are implemented at the national level is influenced 
by the EU institutions.  This means that the way that migration policies are implemented at the 
national level is an impact of Europeanization.  
There are many different ways of measuring Europeanization.  Typically, it is measured 
using qualitative analysis such as the analysis of policy or legislation.  There are not many cases 
of quantitative analysis of Europeanization, but some scholars have tried to use quantitative 
analysis to measure Europeanization’s effect on issues like education or migration policies.  For 
instance, Töller (2010) argues that qualitative analysis on issues of Europeanization is not 
effective or conclusive enough, and there should be more quantitative studies done with 
Europeanization.  She uses quantitative analysis to measure the Europeanization of national 
legislation and assess others’ research, along with her own, to measure Europeanization in the 
UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, and Germany.  She explains how the development of an 
analytical tool would be the most effective way to measure the scope and extent of 
Europeanization of national public policies across different disciplines and countries (Töller, 
2010).  
Töller also explains that Europeanization can be measured by looking at the influence of 
European law on national law.  One can measure the share of legal acts that transposed a 
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European directive into national law.  Töller also states, “Europeanized laws are laws that either 
ratify international treaties, transpose European directives or agreements between Member States 
or judicial decisions by the European Court of Justice” (p. 423).  To have a more quantifiable 
study of Europeanization one has to identify the ratio between national and Europeanized laws.  
The European side must have directives and Regulations and the national side has to have 
primary and secondary law.  To make this simpler, there needs to be a database that has all 
national legislation and organizes legislation with the Eur-Lex (European Union) classification 
(Töller, 2010).  
Nanou, Zapryanova, and Toth (2017) examine the micro-variation in integration patterns 
in the periods between treaties and compares the impact of secondary legislation to that of the 
treaties to create a comprehensive index.  This index is a new resource, “encompassing 1957 to 
2014, on the distribution of authority between the European Union and Member States across 
policy fields”, and the content of both primary and secondary legislation (Nanou et al., 
2017).  To complete this study, the authors used expert surveys and mainly surveyed Jean 
Monnet Chairs on what they thought about different directives, who they thought were the main 
agenda setters, and Europeanization of policy levels in different Member States.  The study 
found that Germany was the leader in levels of Europeanization and agenda setting influence. 
Another way to measure Europeanization is to look at the transposition of European 
policies to national law.  Transposition “is the process of incorporating EU directives into the 
national laws of EU countries.  The directives then have to become law in the EU countries by a 
specific deadline” (European Union, 2018).  The EU Commission has a Single Market 
Scoreboard that measures the performances of Member States to determine if they “completely 
and correctly” transpose the legal measures of the Single Market Directives by the deadlines set 
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out in these directives.  The Single Market Directives are legal measures that have impact on the 
Single Market.  “This includes the four freedoms (freedom of movement of persons, goods, 
services and capital across borders within the EU), and supporting policies that have a direct 
impact on the Single Market” like taxation, employment, culture, education, public health, and 
energy. (European Commission, 2019b).  
After directives are created, each Member State must adopt its own legislation that 
implements the policies outlined in the directives.  While each Member State is allowed to adopt 
these directives in a way that is specific to its own national practices and needs, they must 
correctly meet the guidelines of each directive.  After developing its legislation, each Member 
State notifies the Commission by sending a text of their legislation.  To determine if these 
policies in the directives are correctly transposed, the Commission examines this text that EU 
countries send of their national implementation.  The Commission ensures that the text meets the 
objective of the directive and that the law is implemented and meets any deadlines (European 
Union, 2018).  
The Commission also uses several different indicators to measure the overall 
transposition of policies of EU Member States.  The indicators that are used to determine the 
overall performance score of each country are the transposition deficit (% of all directives not 
transposed), change over the last six months (change in the number of non-transposed 
directives), long-overdue directives (two years or more), total transposition delay (in months) for 
overdue directives, and conformity deficit (% of all directives transposed incorrectly).  Member 
States often fail to comply with these transposition deadlines (König & Luetgert, 2009).   
Because transposition scores reflect the degree to which countries adapt legislation to 
meet the standards outlined in EU directives, the transposition deficit scores will be used to 
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measure Europeanization for each of the EU Member States for this thesis project.  According to 
the European Commission, “the transposition deficit shows the percentage of Single Market 
directives not yet completely notified to the Commission in relation to the total number of 
directives that should have been notified by the deadline” (European Commission, 2019b).  The 
data used in this report uses all the transposition notifications made by December 10, 2018 for 
directives with a transposition deadline on or before November 30, 2018.   
To calculate the deficit, the Commission includes the directives for which no 
transposition measures have been communicated, the directives that are considered to be 
partially transposed by a Member State after it notified some transposition measures, and 
directives that are considered to be completely transposed by a Member State.  The Commission 
can also open an infringement proceeding for non-communication if a Member State has not 
notified new transposition measures (European Commission, 2019b).  Therefore, states with the 
lowest transposition have correctly and completely transposed EU directives into their national 
legislation.  The EU Member States with the lowest transposition deficit scores would therefore 
have the highest levels of Europeanization.  Additionally, data from the Migrant Integration 
Policy Index will be used to compare migrant integration policies in EU Member States.  Table 1 
below shows the MIPEX overall scores alongside variables like labor market mobility, 
education, and healthcare.  The final column shows the transposition deficit score for each 







OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR MIGRANT INTEGRATION 
Healthcare Policies 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights deems healthcare a human right to which 
everyone is entitled.  In fact, “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services…” (United Nations, 1948).  Within the European Union, 
European frameworks work in combination with international frameworks to create a path for 
health equality.  However, it is up to nation states to create legislation and policies that “comply 
with international and European standards that set parameters for the respect of human rights, 
including health” (Mikaba, 2018).   
 It is difficult to discuss migrant health because in the majority of EU Member States, 
collection of data on ethnicity and migrant status is legally prohibited (Mikaba, 2018). At the end 
of 2017, Austria, Croatia, Germany, and Portugal were the only Member States to have defined 
indicators to measure migrant integration in the healthcare field (Mikaba, 2018). Migrants have a 
diverse set of healthcare needs and may face issues when receiving healthcare because of these 
differences in healthcare needs, as well as languages, traditions, and previous levels of care, 
which all vary on migrants’ origin countries (Ledoux et al., 2018).  Migrants and ethnic minority 
groups generally have a lower socio-economic status than nationals, which is the main 
explanation for health inequalities.  Migrants may have difficulty accessing healthcare services 
due to language barriers, costs, location, information, and possibly due to the lack of entitlement 
to receive healthcare (Ledoux et al., 2018).  If countries do not have healthcare benefits 
applicable to migrants, then migrants may need to pay out of pocket for healthcare, which may 
always not be financially possible.  To combat these inequalities, some scholars like Flegar 
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propose that a human rights-based approach to health laws and policies can help “refine and 
concretize the individual rights and state obligations for the preventive health care of 
undocumented migrants” (Flegar et al., 2016, p. 1).  Obviously, health is extremely important for 
any person and the inequalities that migrants face may prevent them from receiving the basic 
right to health to which all humans are entitled.   
 
Education Policies 
 Themes in the literature suggest that education plays a large role in migrant integration.  
In fact, some scholars argue that “education is widely perceived as the main channel through 
which migrant families could economically catch up over generations with the native 
population” (Krause et al., 2015, p. 758). Access to education can provide migrants of all ages 
with the means to learn more about the language and culture of their host country, receive 
vocational training for better job access, and even provide migrants with the opportunity to feel 
as if they share something in common with native Europeans. Carlson et al. (2018) say, 
“Europeanized education or a type of Europeanized policy initiative will provide a “‘common 
ground’ for all members of the European population, be it in terms of language skills, shared 
values, mutual understanding, or a shared sense of the past” (p. 396). 
 Efforts to increase Europeanized education have been made across the EU.  The creation 
of a common European Higher Education Area (EHEA), a European Research Area (ERA), and 
the introduction of mobility programs like Erasmus for students are some examples of initiatives 
taken to create a more “European” education.  Additionally, the European Council has 
emphasized the role of education in bringing Europeans together (Carlson et al., 2018, p. 396).  
“As these examples indicate, education is seen as a means not only of increasing economic 
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competitiveness, but also of fostering a shared sense of belonging or ‘European identity’” 
(Carlson et al., 2018, p. 396).  The Europeanization of education is a perceived as a vital part of 
European social integration (Carlson et al., 2018).  If education is a vital source of integration for 
Europeans, it must also be a gateway for migrants to integrate into European societies. 
 In many EU Member States, migrants are able to use education to their advantage for 
both social integration and through gaining economic opportunities. “From our point of view 
there are vital aspects of the migrants’ successful social integration; we have to integrate the 
migrants who are coming to our country and plan to stay for a longer time to the field of 
education and the labor market (Kőmíves & Dajnoki, 2016, p. 363).  Migrants with higher levels 
of education will be better able to obtain a job as the competition for jobs increases.  Lower-
skilled, less educated social groups may fall behind and will not be able to get these same 
opportunities (Kagan, 2019).  While there is much emphasis on migrant children receiving 
education, especially because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and EU directive 
2013/33 make elementary education compulsory for refugee children, higher education is still 
important for migrants and can be the key to their integration.   
Kagan also argues that the Europeanization of education makes it easier for migrants to 
integrate.  “Europeanization processes…have led to increased emphasis on inclusion and to the 
introduction of shorter degree courses that allow students to enter the labor market more rapidly” 
(Kagan, 2019).  However, migrants do face some inequalities in education as an individual’s 
socioeconomic background is a significant factor in one’s access to education.  People with a 
migrant background are often identified as an under-represented group in higher education 
because they face educational inequalities (Kagan, 2019).  “Typically identified as a less 
advantaged social group the increased participation of immigrants and their descendants in HE 
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[higher education] is vital for their integration and social inclusiveness” (Kagan, 2019, p. 36).  
Therefore, education opens doors for migrants to integrate into society by not only providing 
language and communication skills, but also by giving migrants an opportunity to enter the labor 
market.  
 
Labor Market Policies 
Much of the literature on migrant integration emphasizes how access to labor markets is 
central for migrant integration. “Socioeconomic mobility for migrants, measured in terms of 
education achievement and medium to high-income occupations, is linked to successful 
integration and higher access to valuable opportunities and resources” (Ron-Balsera, 2015, p. 
149). Once migrants enter the workforce of a nation, they are able to fully integrate into society.  
In fact, the MIPEX data shows that labor market mobility is one of the highest policy indicators 
for many EU Member States.  Scholars agree that entering the labor market is the first step for 
migrant integration. Cseh Papp, Bilan, and Dajnoki (2019) state “labor market integration is a 
starting point and a precondition for social integration of immigrants” (p. 183).  Similarly, 
Kőmíves and Dajnoki believe that “the social integration of migrants in a country is closely 
linked to employment, to the integration into the labour market…” (2016, p. 363). 
 However, migrants may face difficulties when trying to enter labor markets in EU 
Member States.  Immigrants may face discrimination or people who have misconceptions about 
migrants, such as the idea that migrants displace domestic labor and cause unemployment.  
Migrants entering labor markets can actually boost economies.  Negative attitudes and prejudices 
towards migrants will prevent them from fully integrating.  Integration of migrants means that 
multilateral relationships are established between migrants and the society to which they are 
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trying to integrate.  The success or failure of this integration depends on the openness and levels 
of prejudice of the receiving society (Cseh Papp et al., 2019).  
 Specific country policies may also prevent migrants from labor market integration.  Many 
European countries impose employment bans that prevent asylum seekers from immediately 
entering the labor market once arriving in their host country (Marbach et al., 2018).  There is 
variation in the wait times for migrants to enter the labor market in each EU Member State. 
Generally, most of these wait times fall between six and twelve months.  Marbach’s study 
showed that these longer employment bans can considerably slow down migrants’ economic 
integration and reduce their motivation to integration soon after their arrival to their host 
countries (2018, p. 1). These employment bans are actually detrimental to economies.  Marbach 
also found that the employment ban costs German taxpayers about forty million euros per year 
“in terms of welfare expenditures and foregone tax revenues from unemployed refugees” (2018, 
p. 1).  Therefore, labor market mobility is very effective for migrant integration, and also helps 
maintain the labor force productivity in EU Member States 
 
WHY GERMANY, SPAIN, AND HUNGARY? 
 These three countries were selected based on general current events, available literature, 
and their overall MIPEX scores.  During the height of the migration crisis, Germany made 
headlines by declaring that it would openly accept one million refugees (Karnitschnig, 2015).  
Because of the willingness of the German government to accept a high number of refugees, the 
German MIPEX score in comparison with other EU countries, and themes in the literature, 
Germany was chosen because I thought it would have a high degree of migrant integration. 
Similarly, Spain has also taken in an inordinate number of migrants.  Spain’s location makes it 
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an accessible point of entry for migrants who cross the Mediterranean and is also a popular 
destination for migrants from northern Africa.  In the summer of 2018, Spain became the main 
entry point for migrants and received twice as many migrants as Greece and six times as many 
times as Italy (Benavides, 2018).  Therefore, Spain was chosen as a case study to determine if the 
large amounts of migrants that have entered have been able to integrate into society.  Hungary 
was chosen because its government has shown a much different attitude than Germany and 
Spain.  The Hungarian government has openly taken an anti-EU and anti-migration stance.  The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) says that everyone has the “right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each state” and “everyone has the right to seek 
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (United Nations, 1948, Article 13.1, 
Article 14.1).  Despite the rights outlined in the UDHR, Péter Szijjarto, the Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, said that the ability to be a refugee and apply for asylum is “ is not a human right” and 
that being a refugee violates border security (Al Jazeera, 2018).  These views of the Hungarian 












CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES 
GERMANY 
 According to the data provided from the Migrant Integration Policy Index, Germany has 
a higher integration score than many other European Union Member States; Germany’s national 
policies may play a significant factor in the ability of migrants to integrate.  First and foremost, 
the German Basic Law outlined in the German constitution describes a fundamental right to 
asylum (German Federal Government, 2020). The German government has also articulated its 
goals to help integrate migrants and emphasizes creating measures to help migrants more 
efficiently and effectively into the German labor market.    
 
Transposition 
 Although Germany was expected to have a higher degree of Europeanization of policy, 
Germany’s transposition deficit score is 1.1%.  The European Union’s proposed and ideal score 
was 0.5% and the target was 1%.  Ultimately, the goal was to stay as close to the target as 
possible.  However, as shown in Figure 1, Germany (Deutschland, or DE) is in the red, meaning 
that it did not meet the target and actually has one of the highest transposition deficit 
percentages.  [See Figure 1 below for a comparison of all the transposition deficit scores.]  
Hypothesis one stated that the degree of migrant integration in a Member State would correlate 
positively with its level of Europeanization.  However, although Germany has higher migrant 
integration scores than Spain, Hungary, and many other Member States, it has one of the worse 





Migrant Healthcare in Germany 
 Out of the three policy areas, Germany’s overall healthcare MIPEX score of 43 is its 
weakest.  The literature indicates that migrants in Germany face difficulties and discrimination 
when trying to obtain proper healthcare.  “There are inequalities in health care utilization 
between migrants and natives in Germany.  These disparities vary in terms of health care sector, 
indicator of health care utilization and migrant population” (Klein & von dem Knesebeck, 2018).  
It is difficult for migrants to get healthcare for various reasons ranging from socioeconomic 
factors, language barriers, and legal issues.  The large majority of the German population has 
private or statutory health insurance, and thus has a health insurance card.  Patients without those 
cards have difficulties accessing health care unless they can directly pay for it themselves 
(Müllerschön et al., 2019, p. 2).  As migrants typically have a lower socioeconomic status 
compared to native citizens, paying for healthcare out of pocket is not always possible.  
Additionally, migrants without a residence permit risk deportation if they cannot afford to pay 
for medical care (Müllerschön et al., 2019, p. 2).  Furthermore, the healthcare system of 
Germany is a social insurance-based public-private system.  Public insurance companies must 
accept any person regardless of their health status.  This would include any German citizen or 
foreigner with a residence permit.  However, undocumented migrants are not mentioned and 
have no right to public health insurance (Flegar et al., 2016, p. 6). 
With that being said, “the German Asylum Law regulates access to healthcare for asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants” (Müllerschön et al., 2019, p. 2).  The asylum seekers who 
are eligible for this medical care have access to care for mainly acute diseases and obstetric 
conditions, “but not for preventive medical check-ups.  In many German federal states, asylum 
seekers have to obtain a medical treatment voucher (MTV) from social welfare offices each time 
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they want to seek medical care, thus decisions about whether the treatment is necessary are not 
made by professional medical staff” (Müllerschön et al., 2019, p. 2).  The German Asylum law 
also allows migrants in Germany to have the right to access the regular health care system after 
staying for 15 months.  Although these asylum seekers may have limited access to healthcare 
resources, they are not given the option of full coverage healthcare and may face obstacles when 
trying to obtain it. 
 
Migrant Education in Germany 
 Directive 2013/33/EU states that minor children should receive access to education 
systems of each Member State (Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, 2013).  While Germany does provide some education to migrants and migrant children, 
migrants do not always receive equal opportunities for education.  This inequality may be the 
reason that Germany has a low score of 47 out of 100 for education.   Krause et al. (2015) argue 
that socioeconomic background plays a large role in education outcomes.  However, migrants 
often are at a socioeconomic disadvantage because of language barriers and difficulties accessing 
labor markets.  If migrants have not been exposed to the native language of their host country, 
they may be less likely to fully access education opportunities or may fall behind in school. 
Tidwell (2019) also discusses education for undocumented migrants in Germany.  Public 
education in Germany is regulated by states without much federal intervention.  There is not a 
federal law that requires all children to have a right to a public education.  Without a federal 
directive, state administrators have the authority to implement policies that prevent 
undocumented children and their parents from getting the right to an education.  German 
legislation says that education is for all citizens, but this does not necessarily include 
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undocumented migrants.  Because the responsibility of public education in Germany is up to the 
sixteen German states, migrants in the various states of Germany may not receive equal 
educational opportunities (Tidwell, 2018).    
 Tjaden (2017) states that “education is seen as the main vehicle for a successful long-
term integration into society” (p. 108). In Germany, migrant education can be supported through 
connection to the labor market.  This is illustrated by Germany’s Vocational Education and 
Training (VET) sector which helps integrate students with migrant backgrounds (Tjaden, 2017).  
Although Germany has a high labor market mobility score, foreign students and migrants are still 
less likely to enter VET compared to native Germans (Tjaden, 2017).  This may be because of 
the language barrier and socioeconomic disadvantages.  Therefore, while migrants legally are 
supposed to have access to German education, their access is limited or may be almost non-
existent in practice, depending on the region of Germany. 
 
Labor Market Mobility in Germany 
Labor market mobility was Germany’s highest scoring policy area, with a high score of 
86.  Germany has developed several acts to help migrants that come into Germany looking for 
asylum or work.  In June of 2019, the German government passed a series of bills that changed 
migration policies in Germany.  For example, the New Skilled Workers Immigration Act makes 
it easier for people from non-EU states to come to Germany.  The Employment Toleration Act 
establishes legal certainty for individuals already living in Germany.  Conversely, individuals 
now applying for asylum now must provide information verbally or in writing, present a passport 
or other form of travel documentation, skill certificates and accept mandatory security measures.   
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The Orderly Return Law also facilitates the deportation of failed asylum seekers and 
gives more power to police and immigration authorities.  The goal of this new law is to increase 
the proportion of successful deportations.  However, this package also includes policies to 
improve the German labor market for skilled workers.  Migrants who do not have asylum status 
that arrived before last summer will be able to stay if they have a job and are able to speak 
German (Mischke, 2019).  This change in legislation led to controversy and debate within the 
German parliament, showing that divisions over migration occur in almost every EU Member 
State.   
Eurobarometer data from the Special Eurobarometer 469 survey conducted in 2017 on 
the integration of immigration in the European Union shows that the majority of Germans have 
favorable opinions towards migration as compared to the data from the other EU Member States.  
For instance, when asked if they agreed or disagreed with the idea that immigrants “take jobs 
away from workers in [our country],” only 21% of Germans surveyed agreed.  Similarly, 73% of 
Germans agreed that immigrants “help to fill jobs for which it’s hard to find workers” (European 
Commission, 2018b).  These numbers indicate that migrants are generally welcome in the 
German labor market.   
Overall, Germany has one of the top ten migrant integration scores out of all of the 
MIPEX countries.  Although Germany did not have a strong score or policies for migrant health 
and education, it excelled in the labor market mobility policy area. This shows that national 
policy provisions for labor play a large role in the ability of migrants to integrate into Germany.  






 Spain scores between Germany and Hungary on the MIPEX scale.  Spain scores high in 
certain policy areas like labor market mobility and lower in areas like migrant education.  While 
there is not an official integration law in Spain, Spanish policymakers have set up two main 
integration strategies for migrants.  There have been two sets of these plans called the First 
Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (PECI).  The first set, named PECI I, covered the 
period from 2007-2010.  Its goal was to adapt public policies in education, employment, social 
services, health and housing to meet the needs of the migrant population.  In 2011, an update 
called PECI II was created that identified six specific areas of action.  Additionally, in 2011, a 
comprehensive strategy was developed to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and 
intolerance.  PECI II covered the period from 2011-2015.  “The inclusion of migrants in the 
workplace, non-discrimination principles and cultural diversity nevertheless continues to be the 
main pillars of the Spanish integration policy” (European Commission, 2019c).  Although the 
Spanish government has created these migrant integration plans, it seems as if they are not 
applied in all policy areas. 
 According to the Spanish Constitution, Organic Laws are related to fundamental rights 
and public liberties.  In 2000, Spain introduced the Organic Law 4/2000, which is the foundation 
of the country’s current legal framework on migration.  This law provides migrants (regardless 
of legal status) with access to healthcare, housing, legal aid, and other services Spanish nationals 
receive, as long as these migrants register with their local municipality (Hooper, 2019; Spanish 
Government, 2000).  The Organic Law 2/2009 is an act that describes the rights and duties of 
migrants in Spain.  This act is referred to as the Spanish Aliens Act and is also known as the law 
on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration.  This act creates the 
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framework for the treatment of irregular migrants and establishes principles to help promote 
legal immigration and limit the number of “irregular” migrants (Dudek & Pestano, 2019).  
“Thus, although one could argue that Schengen has placed parameters on Spain’s immigration 
policy, the Aliens Act is a law the Spanish state put into place to establish Spanish rules and 
norms of immigration beyond the general framework of Schengen” (Dudek & Pestano, 2019).  
Since the migrant crisis, the Organic Law 2/2009 has been particularly important for policy 
implementation and migrant integration.  While Spain has always welcomed migrants, since the 
migration crisis of 2015, the amount of migrants entering Spain has steadily increased 
(Benavides, 2018).   
 
Transposition as a Measure of Europeanization 
 Spain (España or ES in Figure 1) has the highest transposition deficit score of 1.5%.  This 
score means that Spain has the highest deficiency and did not correctly transpose the policies by 
the date given by the European Commission. This outcome was not expected because Spain falls 
between Germany and Hungary with its overall MIPEX score.  If Europeanization does play a 
significant role in migrant integration, then it would be logical for Spain to have a 
Europeanization score that also reflects how it scores for integration.  [See Figure 1 below for a 
comparison of all the transposition deficit scores.]  Like in the first case study, hypothesis one is 
also rejected for Spain.  Spain’s integration scores are relatively high, but it has the worst 
transposition deficit score, and thus the worst level of Europeanization.  Therefore, the degree of 
migrant integration in Spain correlates negatively with the Europeanization of migration policies 




Migrant Healthcare in Spain 
 There are two different kinds of health policies: legislative policies and health system 
responses that make healthcare accessible to migrants.  These health policies can target either 
users or providers.  To target users means to improve health literacy and make information easier 
to understand for migrants.  Targeting providers means training staff members to have new and 
improved knowledge that is culturally adaptable (Ledoux et al., 2018).  The Spanish government 
has an integration plan for migrants with two main objectives of “guaranteeing the right to health 
for foreigners and improving the diversity management capacity of health centers” (Ledoux et 
al., 2018, p. 4).   
 Spain has a national health system called the Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS) which is 
governed by the Ministry of Health and the Departments of Health of Spain’s seventeen 
autonomous communities. This national system is based on coverage of health care through tax 
based rather than social insurance-based funding (Flegar et al., 2016). Each autonomous region 
also has its own health service besides the national one.  Although there are differences in the 
organization of provision of services management, these national and regional health systems 
have the same basic features (Ledoux et al., 2018).   
 Although the migrant integration plan in Spain does have some provisions for migrant 
health, it is difficult to determine who is actually benefitting from these integration policies 
because Spanish policies use the words migrants and immigrants without actually defining who 
is included in these terms.  In Chapter two of this thesis, I define four main types of migrants that 
are present in the European Union: asylum seekers/refugees, economic migrants, internal 
migrants, and victims of human trafficking.  If policies do not explicitly define what specific 
types of migrants that the legislation is targeting, all migrants will not receive equal treatment or 
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health resources.  Because Spain has a MIPEX health score of 53 and does not have clearly 
stated policies that explain how their migrant integration plans are being enforced, this shows 
that the policy provisions do align with migrant integration. 
 The healthcare inequalities in Spain may also be due to a law revision that took place in 
2012.  This change caused the Spanish national healthcare system to go from being universal to 
only covering people who are insured under the social security system or who have a 
dependency tie to such an insured person.  Undocumented migrants would not have regular 
access to this type of healthcare system.  However, while undocumented migrants do not have 
access to preventive health care, there are some exceptions for emergency care, health care to 
children under the age of eighteen, and pre/post-natal care.  Undocumented migrants can still 
access the complete health care package if they can afford being insured with the national health 
system.  Some autonomous communities have expanded their healthcare provisions to include 
undocumented migrants and other people who would otherwise not be covered by SNS (Flegar et 
al., 2016, pp. 13–14).  However, depending on income and regional policies, all migrants do not 
receive equal access to healthcare resources in Spain. 
 
Migrant Education in Spain 
 Spain has a low MIPEX score of 37 for education.  Like Germany, this score shows that 
education is one of Spain’s weakest policy areas for migrant integration.  However, According to 
Article 9 of the Organic Law, foreigners under the age of sixteen have the right to an education 
including access to basic, free, and compulsory education.  Foreigners under the age of eighteen 
are also entitled to post-compulsory education.  This includes obtaining the corresponding 
academic degree and access to the public system of scholarships and grants.  Resident foreigners 
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over the age of eighteen have the right to access post-compulsory educational stages to obtain the 
corresponding qualifications, and to apply to the public scholarship system under the same 
conditions as Spanish citizens (Spanish Government, 2000).  Like with health policies, the word 
foreigners does not specify what types of migrants are entitled to education, and there does not 
seem to be an indication of how exactly migrants are supposed to access this education to which 
they are entitled.   
 Some scholars address how education in Spain may not actually be accessible for all 
migrants, although education is an important aspect of integration.  In fact, Rodríguez-Izquierdo 
and Darmody (2019) explain that in Spain, there is not a general legislative framework 
specifically for migrant education and the legislation can vary between the seventeen 
autonomous communities and cities.  Since 2000, all the autonomous communities and cities 
have developed their own educational programs for migrant students (Rodríguez-Izquierdo & 
Darmody, 2019, p. 47).  Because the educational system is so decentralized, migrants may not 
receive adequate education in all of these regions, which is reflected in Spain’s poor MIPEX 
score for education.  There is also a different degree of autonomy given to schools in each of the 
autonomous communities.  For example, in the region of La Rioja, each educational center has to 
follow organizational guidelines.  However, in the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, the 
process of migrant integration is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, which also 
regulates the measures needed to assist migrant students (Rodríguez-Izquierdo & Darmody, 
2019, p. 47).  Another difference between the communities’ administrations is the possibility of 
another official language besides Castilian Spanish (Catalan in the Balearic Islands, Valencia and 
Catalonia, Galician in Galicia, and Basque or Euskera in the Basque Country and Navarre).   If 
migrants are not familiar with these official languages, they may not be able to take full 
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advantage of these educational opportunities and may be at a significant disadvantage for 
integration. 
In fact, the main obstacle that migrants may face is limited proficiency in the language of 
instruction.  This lack of language proficiency can lead to issues with social and academic 
engagement. “Low proficiency in the language of the host country may result in social exclusion 
and limited post-school pathways as well as difficulties in interaction with different 
communities” (Rodríguez-Izquierdo & Darmody, 2019, p. 49).  If migrants are not given the 
same opportunities as native citizens of their host country, they may not be given the same 
opportunities for social, economic, and political and integration.  “School is one of the most 
important institutions for socialization” (Ron-Balsera, 2015, p. 148).  School provides the 
communication and interpersonal skills to function in society.  However, the Spanish education 
system may not provide the same educational opportunities for migrants as native Spaniards.  
Ron-Balsera argues that the Spanish education system reinforces social inequalities because 
students with a lower social class that are not Spanish natives tend to have higher levels of 
school failure (Ron-Balsera, 2015, p. 168).  Latin American migrants make up a large portion of 
migrants in Spain.  Many of them are Ecuadorian, and these students of Ecuadorian background 
achieve lower education levels than native Spanish students (Ron-Balsera, 2015, p. 149).  
Therefore, the education policy area does not give equal opportunities for migrant integration in 
Spain. 
 
Labor Market Mobility in Spain 
 Spain has a MIPEX score of 72 in the general labor market mobility category.  For 
immediate access to the labor market, Spain scored a 100.  To score a 100 for the immediate 
68 
 
access to market indicator, foreign residents in all categories (permanent residents, residents on 
temporary work permits within a period of one year or greater, and residents on family reunion 
permits) all have to be able to immediately access the labor market (Huddleston et al., 2015).   
 In the EU, high skilled migrants often receive better opportunities for work and are able 
to get a Blue Card. However, low and middle skilled migrants may not receive the same 
economic opportunities and may not be able to seek work right away once entering a host 
country.  In Spain, there are two pathways to admit low and middle skilled migrants.  One is the 
General Regime, which allows employers to sponsor migrants for a specific job.  The other is the 
Collective Management of Hiring in Countries of Origin, or the Collective Management System, 
“which allows employers to recruit groups of workers from countries with which Spain has 
signed a bilateral agreement” (Hooper, 2019).  Employer sponsorship is a big part of the labor 
migration system in Spain (Hooper, 2019).  “In 2018, one-third of Spain’s foreign-born 
population came from four countries: Morocco (13%), Romania (9%), Ecuador (6%), and 
Colombia (6%)” (Hooper, 2019, p. 6).  Employers must go through the General Regime which 
requires the local public employment office to do a labor market check that verifies the fact that 
no Spanish or EU national could first fill the post. Ultimately, in this policy area, Spain had 
similar results to Germany.  Spain’s weaker policy and migrant integration areas were migrant 
health and education, while its labor market policies gave migrants greater opportunity for 
integration.  However, unlike Spain and Germany, Hungary provides weak policy provisions for 








Migrant integration in Hungary is quite different than in both Germany and Spain.  One 
of the main reasons for this is due to the strict migration policies that are practiced in Hungary.  
Within the past two years, the Hungarian Parliament tried to pass a law that prevented anyone 
from coming to the aid of migrants.  Under the terms of this new law, anyone who helps 
migrants, whether it be distributing information about the asylum process, or providing migrants 
with financial assistance, could get twelve months in jail (Kingsley, 2018).  The government has 
even created walls at each of its borders to prevent migrants from entering Hungary after going 
through other EU Member States.  Those migrants that are able to cross borders are often held at 
migrant detention centers.  As a result, there has been a huge decline in asylum applications for 
Hungary (International Organization for Migration, 2018). 
Hungary’s policies directly clash with EU directives and core European Union values. 
Fidesz, the governing party of Hungary led by Viktor Orban, is extremely critical of the EU and 
migration.  Part of this Eurosceptic platform has led Hungary to publicly state its position against 
refugees and migrants.  These physical walls that Hungary has created combined with laws 
aimed at reducing the number of migrants attempting to enter Hungary has led to much criticism.  
The European Parliament stated that the Hungarian government has breached EU core principles 
including human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights.  The EU has accused the Hungarian government of violating these core principles through 
its allowance of government corruption, the passage of anti-refugee laws, and controlling the 
media (Al Jazeera, 2018).  Hungary has even been admonished by the European Court of Human 
Rights.  “The court ruled that the detention of migrants in transit zones qualified as a violation of 
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the right to liberty and challenged the legality of the detention centers policies” (International 
Organization for Migration, 2018).   
The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Péter Szijjarto, has responded to the criticism and 
defended Hungary’s stance on refugees.  In a statement to Al Jazeera, Szijjarto states that 
Hungary is not violating EU values and argues that the right to asylum is “not a human right.” 
He also says, “My question is how you can be a refugee and violate the borders of five or six 
safe countries” (Al Jazeera, 2018).  These sentiments are not just limited to the Hungarian 
government.  Hungarian citizens have grown to have similar opinions on immigration because of 
government influence.  Eurobarometer data indicates that 81% of Hungarians surveyed stated 
that they felt negatively towards immigration from outside of the European Union and 94% of 
people said that they would like more measures for irregular migration (International 
Organization for Migration, 2018).   
 
Transposition as a Measure of Europeanization 
 Hungary met the transposition guidelines outlined by the European Commission.  
Hungary is placed at 9 (HU) on the chart shown in Figure 1 below and has a transposition deficit 
score of 0.9%.  This means that Hungary correctly transposed the EU Regulations by the 
proposed timeline.  This result was unexpected because of Hungary’s anti-EU stance and low 
migrant integration scores.  [See Figure 1 below for a comparison of all the transposition scores.]  
Because Hungary has a better transposition score than both Germany and Spain, but some of the 
worst migrant integration scores in the EU, hypothesis one is rejected.  This shows that there is a 




Migrant Healthcare in Hungary 
 For migrants trying to enter Hungary today, not being able to access healthcare is a 
common reality.  Hungary’s health score is 40, indicating that migrants do not have much access 
to health resources.  According to Chapter 2, Articles 5 and 11 of Directive 2013/33/EU, 
migrants who have applied for asylum, or are even in detention, should be provided with 
healthcare resources.  However, the Hungarian government disagrees.  The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó, discussed migrant healthcare at a plenary session on universal 
healthcare coverage at the UN General Assembly of 2019.  He said, “Hungary will under no 
circumstances recognise the migration-related parts of the UN declaration on universal 
healthcare services, according to which UN Member States would have to provide the same level 
of services to illegal migrants as to their tax paying citizens (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 2019).  Szijjártó also stated that the Hungarian government “is also unable to 
accept the fact that illegal migrants should in any way receive the same level of services as 
Hungarian tax paying citizens, and refuses to negatively discriminate against its own citizens” 
(Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019).  These statements directly oppose 
international and European Union standards for human rights.   
 Language barriers also play a huge role in migrants not receiving proper health care in 
Hungary.  Only thirteen Member States provide interpreters for free to patients with inadequate 
proficiency in the host country’s language.  In Hungary, patients must pay for the costs of 
interpreters.  The impact of not having this service, or not being able to afford it, can be 
detrimental.  “This does not only disadvantage the patient, but it also creates a burden for the 
care providers, as doctors are legally obligated to inform the patient about their rights, diagnosis 
and treatment in order to obtain informed consent” (Mikaba, 2018).  
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 Marek et al. (2019) conducted a questionnaire survey among migrants from the largest 
Hungarian refugee center to determine their health knowledge and access to healthcare in 
Hungary (p. e36).  The results showed that 52% of participants had no information about 
healthcare provisions and 61% had not participated in any medical assessment since arriving to 
this healthcare center.  Medical screening for certain infectious diseases is mandatory in Hungary 
and is performed a few days after arrival at reception centers; however, more than 90% of 
migrants leave these reception centers before the medical screening is completed and an asylum 
status decision is made (Marek et al., 2019).  The MIPEX data used in this study shows that the 
Hungarian health system provides even less information to migrant patients than health systems 
of most of the EU countries. 
 The Hungarian public health care system is also positioned to favor those who are 
economically prosperous.  This system is horizontally accessible for third country nationals that 
are economically active.  People that have paid employment or those that are self-employed who 
are paying social insurance contributions are entitled to the health care system.  Access to third 
country nationals who are not economic migrants is subject to the registration of residence and 
possession of a permanent residence permit (Illés & Gellér-Lukács, 2016).  This means that 
asylum seekers, along with other migrants, in Hungary do not have equal footing with nationals 
in terms of healthcare. 
 
Migrant Education in Hungary 
 The Hungarian government has complete control over the education system.  Since 
gaining power in 2010, Viktor Orban has engaged in educational reforms, which includes 
supplying textbooks that portray nationalism (CNN, 2019).  EU Directive 2013/33, Article 14 
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discusses that minor children of asylum applicants and applicants that are minors should receive 
access to education.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released a 
publication in 2019 that reviews the access to education for refugee and migrant children in 
Europe.   This publication showed that migrant children in Hungary are often excluded from 
receiving education (UNHCR, 2019).  
 Despite Hungary’s open anti-migration stance, Hungary is known for accepting migrants 
that are EU-nationals.  The StepTogether Programme is one of the practices that is used to 
prevent students from leaving school early in Hungary.  The main goal is to improve the 
language competence of migrant pupils and decrease school dropout rates to support pupils in 
their transition from primary to secondary school.  This program helps to integrate migrant 
children who are non-native speakers.  Historically, these students have been migrants and 
migrant children from neighboring countries (Rostás & Kecskés, 2016).  Non-EU nationals do 
not receive the same treatment and that is indicated through Hungary’s anti-immigration policies 
and its MIPEX education score of 15. 
 
Labor Market Mobility in Hungary 
 Hungary has an overall labor market mobility score of 40, but a 0 for immediate access to 
labor markets.  The literature clearly indicates that labor market integration is a vital aspect of 
effective migrant integration.  However, discrimination is one of the barriers to migrants being 
fully integrated.  In Hungary, ethnicity is second on the list of most serious discrimination factors 
(Kőmíves & Dajnoki, 2016, p. 363).  The European Commission has examined forms of 
discrimination in the workplace.  The authors highlight a study from the Commission that states 
that in Hungary the discrimination factors are age (over 55 years), disability, gender, and 
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ethnicity.  Hungary demonstrates more of these discrimination factors than other EU Member 
States (Kőmíves & Dajnoki, 2016, p. 368).  According to data from Special Eurobarometer 469, 
less than half of Hungarian citizens (32%) would feel comfortable with having a migrant as a 
work colleague (European Commission, 2018b).  Out of those polled, only 27% of Hungarians 
believe that immigrants have a positive effect on the economy of the respondent’s country 
(European Commission, 2018b).   
 Despite these negative sentiments, a pattern of increasing numbers of foreign employees 
in Hungary is apparent; there is an influx of workers coming from neighboring countries like 
Serbia and Ukraine. The Hungarian legal system categorizes migrants into categories of citizens 
of the European Economic Area and citizens of third countries.  Members of the European 
Economic Area are able to work in Hungary without permission and do not need a work permit; 
members just have a duty to register (Cseh Papp et al., 2019). Thus, the Hungarian labor market 
also seems to not discriminate against migrants from other European nations but is more against 
migrants from countries outside of Europe.    
 In a study done by Botrić (2016), a comparative analysis approach is taken to analyze 
migration in Croatia by comparing it to Hungary and Slovenia using data from the European 
Social Survey, Labor Force Survey, and Migrant Integration Policy Index.  This article 
highlighted that the “studies on European economies usually find that immigrants have lower 
labor force participation, higher rates of unemployment, and are frequently clustered in lower-
paid jobs” (Botrić, 2016, p. 10).  Compared to Slovenia and Croatia, Hungary is less open 
towards immigrants of a different race or ethnic group.  The literature shows that migrants, 
especially those who have migrated for humanitarian reasons, are less likely to participate in 
local labor markets (Botrić, 2016, p. 18).  Hungary discriminates against migrants that are non-
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EU nationals, but prioritizes integrating migrants that are from European nations, especially 
nearby nations like Serbia.  Overall, the Hungarian national policy provisions reflect its MIPEX 























CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
Hypothesis one focused on the correlation between migrant integration and 
Europeanization.  The transposition deficit scores provided by the European Commission were 
used as a measure for Europeanization.  The European Commission’s goal for the transposition 
scores was for states to achieve a score between 0.5% and 1%.  Out of the three chosen Member 
States, Hungary had the lowest deficit percentage at 0.9%, despite having one of the lowest 
MIPEX integration scores.  Conversely, Germany and Spain are within the top ten scorers on the 
MIPEX scale, but Germany received a transposition deficit score of 1.1% and Spain received the 
worst score of all at 1.5%.  Therefore, hypothesis one was rejected.   For each case study, there 
was a negative correlation between the degree of migrant integration in the Member States and 
their levels of Europeanization.  Despite the fact that Hungary has a better transposition score 
than Germany and Spain, it still has more restrictive migration policies and has a government 
that is very unwilling to accept migrants.  These results indicate that Europeanization does not 
play a significant factor in migrant integration. [See Figure 1 below for the transposition deficit 
scores for each EU Member State.] 
Hypothesis two focused on the correlation between national healthcare policies and 
migrant integration.  [See Table 5 below for the MIPEX health scores sorted from lowest to 
highest.]  None of the three countries had a particularly high MIPEX score in the healthcare 
policy area and the national policy provisions for each country reflected these scores.  In both 
Germany and Spain, migrants may face difficulties attempting to get healthcare because of a lack 
of laws that protect undocumented migrants.  The laws that are in place in both of these countries 
do not give migrants access to preventive care.  The Hungarian government is directly against 
giving migrants any of the services citizens would receive, including healthcare.  For this policy 
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area, the degree of migrant integration did correlate positively with national healthcare policy 
provisions.  Thus, hypothesis two was confirmed. 
Furthermore, hypothesis three focused on the relationship between national education 
policies and migrant integration.  None of the case studies had high MIPEX scores in this policy 
area either.  Germany and Spain have decentralized education systems and lack legislative 
frameworks for migrant education.  The legislation for education can vary from region to region 
in both of these countries.  In Hungary, the government has total control over the education 
system and uses education to promote nationalism, which means that migrant children are often 
excluded from receiving education.  Thus, the policy provisions provided in these Member States 
correlated with their migrant integration scores and hypothesis three was also confirmed. [See 
Table 4 for the MIPEX education scores sorted from lowest to highest.] 
Finally, hypothesis four was also confirmed through a positive correlation between 
national labor policies and migrant integration.  [See Table 3 for the MIPEX labor market 
mobility scores sorted from lowest to highest.]  All three countries had their highest scores in 
labor market mobility.  Within the past two years, Germany has created new policies aimed at 
helping migrants that are looking for work to enter the labor markets in Germany more easily.  
Spain allows employers to sponsor migrants and allows migrants to immediately access the 
markets upon arrival.  Hungary allows migrants from other EU Member States to work without a 
permit but does not allow the same labor privileges to non-EU nationals.  The fact that labor 
market mobility was the highest scoring policy area for the case studies means that migrants 
generally have better opportunities to integrate through labor markets than other policy areas.   
Furthermore, this study found that labor market mobility and migrant education are more 
connected than they initially seemed.  If migrants are provided with access to education, then 
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they may be able to receive training that prepares them to join labor markets more effectively 
and efficiently.  For example, programs like VET in Germany allow migrants to receive proper 
education and training to enter the labor market successfully.  However, like the labor market 
policies, in all three countries the better the policy provisions for health and education, the higher 
the degree of migrant integration.  Therefore, migrant integration is caused by the national policy 
provisions provided by each Member State in every policy area. 
 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
I argued that national policy provisions would play a greater role in migrant integration 
than Europeanization.  This study showed that this theory was correct, and Europeanization did 
not play a significant role in migrant integration.  Instead, national legislation and policies in EU 
Member States provide migrants with opportunities to integrate. Although national policy 
provisions are the direct cause for migrant integration, that does not mean that Europeanization 
does not play a limited role.  As mentioned previously, Europeanization is a term that can refer 
to the spread of norms and values created at the supranational level.  Although each Member 
State creates its own policies for migrant integration, Member States may create these policies 
with European Union values and directives in mind.  For instance, EU Directive 2013/33 sets 
standards for Member States on what to do for migrants that have applied for asylum.  If 
Member States are considering European standards when forming national policy provisions, 
then that is a form of Europeanization.  However, if this is the only role that Europeanization 




  The literature showed that factors such as migrant healthcare, education, and labor 
market mobility are policy areas that would best allow for migrant integration.  The results of 
this study showed that out of these three policy areas, labor market mobility gives migrants the 
best opportunities for integration. Education also has a closer relationship to labor than 
anticipated.  Migrants that receive education and specific vocational training are more likely to 
successfully enter the labor market.  While this outcome was not expected, it does make sense.  
For someone to feel as if they are part of a society, one must have a role in it.  Labor market 
mobility gives migrants this role and provides them with the means for both social and economic 
integration.  Education gives migrants greater opportunity for social integration through 
providing resources for language and cultural assimilation.  Vocational training or educational 
programs that are directly linked to job training help give migrants the means to enter the 
workforce.   Someone who is integrated into the labor market will also have the means to acquire 
healthcare.  These policy areas are all connected, and help migrants receive better equality and 
thus, give them more opportunities for integration.   
Furthermore, this thesis contributed to the literature on Europeanization and migrant 
integration by solidifying the argument that the European Union does not play a large role in 
migration.  Despite the importance of Member States in the field of migration policy, as a 
researcher, I still argue that multi-level governance is the best approach to discuss European 
integration.  The EU and its nations are only able to function because of the interconnection of 
state and non-state actors at the supranational, national, and regional levels.  Many Member 
States have national policies in addition to more specific policies that may differ at regional and 
local levels.  The way that Member States are able to function would not be possible without this 
multi-tiered governance.   
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The concept of Europeanization may not just be restricted to the European region.  
Values like human rights and the ability to gain asylum are central values of the European 
Union, but also are values that many other nations like the United States also support.  The 
extent to which these values are upheld all over the world will also impact how migrants are 
integrated into any society.  Migrant integration is not something that just impacts Europe but is 
an issue that impacts nations all over the world.   
To make effective migration policies, states must focus on international and regional 
human rights frameworks that ensure that migrants are protected.  Creating effective migration 
policies goes beyond just forming legislation.  Measures have to be enacted to ensure that these 
policies are actually being enforced and that they apply to all types of migrants.  Additionally, 
for full integration, migration policies must include national policy provisions that allow 
migrants to enter labor forces.  To allow for migrants to fully integrate into these labor markets, 
additional policy measures may need to be taken including providing vocational training or 
specialized education programs that allow for full language immersion.  This would help 
migrants to communicate effectively in their host societies and be better equipped to acquire a 
job.  If these measures are taken, and effective, enforceable legislation on migration and migrant 
integration is created, then migrants, not just in the European Union, but across the world will be 
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APPENDIX: MIPEX AND EUROPEANIZATION DATA VISUALIZATION 
 
 




















Table 1: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization 
(in alphabetical order by country) 
 
 


















Mobility3 Education4 Health5 
Transposition 
Deficit (%)6 
Australia 66  58 76 67 0 
Austria 48  64 47 63 1.2 
Belgium 70  64 61 53 1.3 
Bulgaria 44  50 3 28 0.7 
Canada 70  81 65 49 0 
Croatia 44  54 15 20 0.3 
Cyprus 36  34 27 31 1.4 
Czechia 45  52 38 44 0.7 
Denmark 59  79 49 53 0.7 
Estonia 49  73 58 27 0.3 
Finland 71  80 60 53 0.5 
France 54  54 36 50 0.5 
Germany 63  86 47 43 1.1 
Greece 46  55 36 27 0.5 
Hungary 46  40 15 40 0.9 
Iceland 46  51 23 40 0 
Ireland 51  38 30 58 0.9 
Italy 58  66 34 65 0.8 
Japan 43  65 21 51 0 
Latvia 34  46 17 17 0.8 
Lithuania 38  40 17 26 0.6 
Luxembourg 60  42 48 43 1.1 
Malta 39  45 19 45 0.3 
Netherlands 61  73 50 55 0.3 
New Zealand 70  67 66 75 0 
Norway 69  90 65 67 0 
Poland 43  38 20 26 1 
Portugal 80  91 62 43 0.4 
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Romania 45  57 20 45 1.1 
Slovakia 38  21 24 31 0.2 
Slovenia 48  38 26 18 0.7 
South Korea 55  71 57 36 0 
Spain 61  72 37 53 1.5 
Sweden 80  98 77 62 0.1 
Switzerland 46  59 42 70 0 




67 57 64 0 
United States 62  56 60 69 0 
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Table 2: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization 




Country MIPEX Overall Integration Score Labor Market Mobility Education Health Transposition Deficit (%)
Turkey 24 15 5 32 0
Latvia 34 46 17 17 0.8
Cyprus 36 34 27 31 1.4
Lithuania 38 40 17 26 0.6
Slovakia 38 21 24 31 0.2
Malta 39 45 19 45 0.3
Japan 43 65 21 51 0
Poland 43 38 20 26 1
Bulgaria 44 50 3 28 0.7
Croatia 44 54 15 20 0.3
Czechia 45 52 38 44 0.7
Romania 45 57 20 45 1.1
Greece 46 55 36 27 0.5
Hungary 46 40 15 40 0.9
Iceland 46 51 23 40 0
Switzerland 46 59 42 70 0
Austria 48 64 47 63 1.2
Slovenia 48 38 26 18 0.7
Estonia 49 73 58 27 0.3
Ireland 51 38 30 58 0.9
France 54 54 36 50 0.5
South Korea 55 71 57 36 0
United Kingdom* 56 67 57 64 0
Italy 58 66 34 65 0.8
Denmark 59 79 49 53 0.7
Luxembourg 60 42 48 43 1.1
Netherlands 61 73 50 55 0.3
Spain 61 72 37 53 1.5
United States 62 56 60 69 0
Germany 63 86 47 43 1.1
Australia 66 58 76 67 0
Norway 69 90 65 67 0
Belgium 70 64 61 53 1.3
Canada 70 81 65 49 0
New Zealand 70 67 66 75 0
Finland 71 80 60 53 0.5
Portugal 80 91 62 43 0.4
Sweden 80 98 77 62 0.1
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Table 3: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization 





Country MIPEX Overall Integration Score Labor Market Mobility Education Health Transposition Deficit (%)
Turkey 24 15 5 32 0
Slovakia 38 21 24 31 0.2
Cyprus 36 34 27 31 1.4
Ireland 51 38 30 58 0.9
Poland 43 38 20 26 1
Slovenia 48 38 26 18 0.7
Hungary 46 40 15 40 0.9
Lithuania 38 40 17 26 0.6
Luxembourg 60 42 48 43 1.1
Malta 39 45 19 45 0.3
Latvia 34 46 17 17 0.8
Bulgaria 44 50 3 28 0.7
Iceland 46 51 23 40 0
Czechia 45 52 38 44 0.7
Croatia 44 54 15 20 0.3
France 54 54 36 50 0.5
Greece 46 55 36 27 0.5
United States 62 56 60 69 0
Romania 45 57 20 45 1.1
Australia 66 58 76 67 0
Switzerland 46 59 42 70 0
Austria 48 64 47 63 1.2
Belgium 70 64 61 53 1.3
Japan 43 65 21 51 0
Italy 58 66 34 65 0.8
New Zealand 70 67 66 75 0
United Kingdom* 56 67 57 64 0
South Korea 55 71 57 36 0
Spain 61 72 37 53 1.5
Estonia 49 73 58 27 0.3
Netherlands 61 73 50 55 0.3
Denmark 59 79 49 53 0.7
Finland 71 80 60 53 0.5
Canada 70 81 65 49 0
Germany 63 86 47 43 1.1
Norway 69 90 65 67 0
Portugal 80 91 62 43 0.4
Sweden 80 98 77 62 0.1
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Table 4: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization 





Country MIPEX Overall Integration Score Labor Market Mobility Education Health Transposition Deficit (%)
Bulgaria 44 50 3 28 0.7
Turkey 24 15 5 32 0
Croatia 44 54 15 20 0.3
Hungary 46 40 15 40 0.9
Latvia 34 46 17 17 0.8
Lithuania 38 40 17 26 0.6
Malta 39 45 19 45 0.3
Poland 43 38 20 26 1
Romania 45 57 20 45 1.1
Japan 43 65 21 51 0
Iceland 46 51 23 40 0
Slovakia 38 21 24 31 0.2
Slovenia 48 38 26 18 0.7
Cyprus 36 34 27 31 1.4
Ireland 51 38 30 58 0.9
Italy 58 66 34 65 0.8
France 54 54 36 50 0.5
Greece 46 55 36 27 0.5
Spain 61 72 37 53 1.5
Czechia 45 52 38 44 0.7
Switzerland 46 59 42 70 0
Austria 48 64 47 63 1.2
Germany 63 86 47 43 1.1
Luxembourg 60 42 48 43 1.1
Denmark 59 79 49 53 0.7
Netherlands 61 73 50 55 0.3
South Korea 55 71 57 36 0
United Kingdom* 56 67 57 64 0
Estonia 49 73 58 27 0.3
Finland 71 80 60 53 0.5
United States 62 56 60 69 0
Belgium 70 64 61 53 1.3
Portugal 80 91 62 43 0.4
Canada 70 81 65 49 0
Norway 69 90 65 67 0
New Zealand 70 67 66 75 0
Australia 66 58 76 67 0
Sweden 80 98 77 62 0.1
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Table 5: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization 





Country MIPEX Overall Integration Score Labor Market Mobility Education Health Transposition Deficit (%)
Latvia 34 46 17 17 0.8
Slovenia 48 38 26 18 0.7
Croatia 44 54 15 20 0.3
Lithuania 38 40 17 26 0.6
Poland 43 38 20 26 1
Estonia 49 73 58 27 0.3
Greece 46 55 36 27 0.5
Bulgaria 44 50 3 28 0.7
Cyprus 36 34 27 31 1.4
Slovakia 38 21 24 31 0.2
Turkey 24 15 5 32 0
South Korea 55 71 57 36 0
Hungary 46 40 15 40 0.9
Iceland 46 51 23 40 0
Germany 63 86 47 43 1.1
Luxembourg 60 42 48 43 1.1
Portugal 80 91 62 43 0.4
Czechia 45 52 38 44 0.7
Malta 39 45 19 45 0.3
Romania 45 57 20 45 1.1
Canada 70 81 65 49 0
France 54 54 36 50 0.5
Japan 43 65 21 51 0
Belgium 70 64 61 53 1.3
Denmark 59 79 49 53 0.7
Finland 71 80 60 53 0.5
Spain 61 72 37 53 1.5
Netherlands 61 73 50 55 0.3
Ireland 51 38 30 58 0.9
Sweden 80 98 77 62 0.1
Austria 48 64 47 63 1.2
United Kingdom* 56 67 57 64 0
Italy 58 66 34 65 0.8
Australia 66 58 76 67 0
Norway 69 90 65 67 0
United States 62 56 60 69 0
Switzerland 46 59 42 70 0
New Zealand 70 67 66 75 0
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Table 6: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization 
(Sorted lowest to highest for transposition deficit scores) 
Country MIPEX Overall Integration Score Labor Market Mobility Education Health Transposition Deficit (%)
Australia 66 58 76 67 0
Canada 70 81 65 49 0
Iceland 46 51 23 40 0
Japan 43 65 21 51 0
New Zealand 70 67 66 75 0
Norway 69 90 65 67 0
South Korea 55 71 57 36 0
Switzerland 46 59 42 70 0
Turkey 24 15 5 32 0
United Kingdom* 56 67 57 64 0
United States 62 56 60 69 0
Sweden 80 98 77 62 0.1
Slovakia 38 21 24 31 0.2
Croatia 44 54 15 20 0.3
Estonia 49 73 58 27 0.3
Malta 39 45 19 45 0.3
Netherlands 61 73 50 55 0.3
Portugal 80 91 62 43 0.4
Finland 71 80 60 53 0.5
France 54 54 36 50 0.5
Greece 46 55 36 27 0.5
Lithuania 38 40 17 26 0.6
Bulgaria 44 50 3 28 0.7
Czechia 45 52 38 44 0.7
Denmark 59 79 49 53 0.7
Slovenia 48 38 26 18 0.7
Italy 58 66 34 65 0.8
Latvia 34 46 17 17 0.8
Hungary 46 40 15 40 0.9
Ireland 51 38 30 58 0.9
Poland 43 38 20 26 1
Germany 63 86 47 43 1.1
Luxembourg 60 42 48 43 1.1
Romania 45 57 20 45 1.1
Austria 48 64 47 63 1.2
Belgium 70 64 61 53 1.3
Cyprus 36 34 27 31 1.4
Spain 61 72 37 53 1.5
